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ESSAY
Social Checks and Balances:
A Private Fairness Doctrine
Michael P. Vandenbergh*
This Essay proposes a private standardsand certificationsystem
to induce media firms to provide more complete and accurate
information. It argues that this new private governance system is a
viable response to the channelized flow of information that is
exacerbating political polarization in the United States. Specifically,
this Essay proposes development of a new private fairness doctrine to
replace the standard repealed by the Federal Communications
Commission in 1987. A broad-based, multistakeholder organization
could develop and implement this private fairness doctrine, and the
certification process could harness market and social pressure to
influence the practices of traditionaland new media firms. A growing
literature demonstrates how private governance initiatives can perform
the functions of government in the environmental, labor, gun control,
animal welfare, and fair trade areas. This Essay argues that private
governance initiativessuch as the new private fairness doctrine can also
bolster the social checks and balances that support the processes of
democratic governance. Any intervention into the flow of information
creates risks, but so does inaction, and the private fairness doctrine
holds out the possibility of improving the information available for
public discourse while limiting the risks of government intervention. In
the long term, the concept of private governance can also stimulate

Professor and David Daniels Allen Distinguished Chair of Law, Vanderbilt University
*
Law School. For helpful comments, I owe thanks to David Adelman, Linda Breggin, Lisa
Bressman, Jim Blumstein, Joey Fishkin, Jonathan Gilligan, Jonathan Lipson, Timothy Lytton,
Will Martin, Ed Rubin, Ganesh Sitaraman, Kevin Stack, Paul Stern, Rory Van Loo, the Reading
Group on Private Regulation, and to workshop participants at Temple University Beasley School
of Law, University of Texas School of Law, and Vanderbilt University Law School. Baker Gerwig,
Elizabeth Holden, John Hubbard, William Milberg, Matt LaRue, Samantha Speer, Rae Meade
Torres, and Shannon Vreeland provided excellent research and editing assistance.

811

8 12

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:3:811

creative thinking on interventions to improve other core democratic
processes, including campaign finance, voting, ballot security, and
others.
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INTRODUCTION

If I am a liberal, I can get my news from liberal cable television
programs, listen to liberal radio stations, read liberal newspapers and
blogs, and receive filtered information tailored to my liberal views from
Facebook, Google, and Twitter. I can easily avoid inconvenient
conservative opinions or facts that might support a conservative policy.
If I am a conservative, I can do the same, except that I will watch Fox
News, not MSNBC; listen to Rush Limbaugh, not Progress radio; read
the Wall Street Journal editorial page, not the Washington Post; and
read Breitbart, not the Huffington Post. The filters used by new media
firms will expose me to conservative sources of information and screen
out liberal sources. I can live in a conservative world, unfettered by
inconvenient liberal opinions or the facts that support them.
Some channelized flow of information has always been a feature
of political discourse in the United States-the Founders famously used
their own captive newspapers to put their preferred spin on the issues
of the day-but a growing body of empirical research suggests that the
channelization of information flows has become pervasive in the last
several decades.' Similarly, polarization has always been a feature of
political discourse in the United States. The Founders used their
captive newspapers and other means for vicious political and personal
attacks on opponents, and certainly the polarization leading up to the
Civil War was intense. 2 But a growing literature again suggests that
1.
For reviews of the literature, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, #REPUBLIC: DIVIDED DEMOCRACY IN
THE AGE OF SOCIAL MEDIA (2017) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, #REPUBLIC]; and CASS R. SUNSTEIN,

REPUBLIC.COM 2.0 (2007). For an early examination in the popular press of the extremism fostered
by new media, see Elizabeth Kolbert, The Things People Say, NEW YORKER (Oct. 26, 2009),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/11/02/the-things-people-say [perma.cclEKY6-V7HD].
2.

Compare JILL LEPORE, THESE TRUTHS: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (2018)

(suggesting that polarization has been common in American history and that the post-World War
II period of lower polarization was an anomaly), and RICHARD WHITE, THE REPUBLIC FOR WHICH

2020]

A PRIVATE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE

813

the current era is at the extreme end. Regardless of whether
polarization levels are comparable to past levels, polarization is
impairing the ability of government to respond to core problems today: 3
studies suggest that polarization correlates with, and perhaps is a
substantial cause of, the inability of the federal and state governments
to respond to core social problems. 4
The social checks and balances that placed some constraints on
politicians' partisan behavior in past eras also seem to be at a low ebb.
In the 1950s, Robert Dahl argued that social influences limit the efforts
of many politicians and political operatives to abuse common norms of
fair play.5 For instance, state legislators may be discouraged from
skewing legislative voting procedures while in office because of concerns
that doing so will be exposed and will induce their opponents to do so
when they are in office. According to Dahl, social checks and balances
are a frequently overlooked element of a successful democracy. The
point is not that politicians and political operatives never engaged in
self-dealing or manipulated norms of fair play-and the use of racedbased voting requirements in the South is a prime example-but in
many areas of the country social checks and balances provided
meaningful constraints on overreaching by these actors. Numerous
commentators have noted that these core norms of democratic fair play
6
have eroded substantially in the last two decades.
This Essay argues that the channelized flow of information has
undermined the enforcement of the social norms that function as social
IT STANDS: THE UNITED STATES DURING RECONSTRUCTION AND THE GILDED AGE: 1865-1896 (2017)

(noting high levels of polarization during the second half of the nineteenth century), with ROBERT
B. TALISSE, OVERDOING DEMOCRACY: WHY WE MUST PUT POLITICS IN ITS PLACE (2019) (suggesting

that polarization has increased and has extended to areas such as consumer behavior, workplaces,
and residential settlement patterns).
See Aaron M. McCright, Chenyang Xiao & Riley E. Dunlap, PoliticalPolarization on
3.
Support for Government Spending on Environmental Protection in the USA, 1974-2012, 48 Soc.
Scl. RES. 251 (2014) (examining polarization on environmental issues).
For a recent discussion, see MICHAEL P. VANDENBERGH & JONATHAN M. GILLIGAN,
4.
BEYOND POLITICS: THE PRIVATE GOVERNANCE RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE 119-76 (2017).
See ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 83 (1956) (arguing that the
5.

presence of such social constraints "may be far more important in strengthening democracy than
any particular constitutional design"); see also discussion infra notes 97-99 (exploring how implicit
social and political norms may constrain the party in power).
6.

See, e.g., STEVEN LEVITSKY & DANIEL ZIBLATT, How DEMOCRACIES DIE 12, 84-90 (2018)

(noting the declining role of core democratic norms such as mutual toleration (accepting rivals as
legitimate) and forbearance (exercising restraint rather than using full constitutional powers));
(Apr. 13, 2018),
Evan McMullin, An Attack on the Rule of Law, THE ATLANTIC
5 57 9 2
[https://
1 /
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/04/assault-on-democracy/
perma.cc/J498-BV9D] (criticizing President Trump's attacks on American institutions as
undermining democratic legitimacy); see also Joseph Fishkin & David E. Pozen, Asymmetric
Constitutional Hardball, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 915, 940-43 (2018) (noting the importance of
differences in norms between Democrats and Republicans in pursuing constitutional strategies).
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checks and balances. Dahl's original use of the term social checks and
balances referred to the informal norms that constrain the behavior of
politicians and political operatives, enforced through the iterative
relationships among politicians and the oversight of the general public.
The channelized flow of information undermines enforcement of these
norms; it can enable a politician's constituents to avoid exposure to
negative information about the behavior of the politician and create
justifications for violation of fair-play norms. In this setting, the social
checks and balances that might induce a politician to accept rivals as
legitimate and exercise self-restraint when in power are weak at best.'
This is not the place to resolve debates among historians,
political scientists, and lawyers about the relationships among
information channelization, polarization, and social checks and
balances. Instead, this Essay assumes that the channelized flow of
information through traditional and new media is exacerbating the
polarization and dysfunction of the U.S. political process. Drawing on
the emerging private governance literature,8 this Essay proposes a new
private standards and certification system designed to induce
traditional and new media companies to provide more complete and
accurate information. In turn, that information may enable more
informed democratic discourse, reduce polarization, and buttress social
checks and balances. For convenience, I use the term private fairness
doctrine to refer to both the new fairness doctrine standard and the
organization that would implement the standard.
7.

See LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra note 6.

8.
See Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, 99 CORNELL L. REV.
129, 146 (2013) (defining "private environmental governance" and explaining that "actions taken
by. . . non-governmental [environmental] entities often include the traditional standard-setting,
implementation, monitoring, enforcement, and adjudication functions of governments"). Similarly,
in recent years scholars have noted that civil society can play "the pluralistic Congress's popular,
deliberative role." Jon D. Michaels, An Enduring, Evolving Separationof Powers, 115 COLUM. L.
REV. 515, 552 (2015); see also Jon D. Michaels, Of Constitutional Custodians and Regulatory
Rivals: An Account of the Old and New Separation of Powers, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 227, 250 (2016)
(noting the role of civil society in influencing agency actions). The private governance initiatives I
focus on here induce not just the groups often included in "civil society," but also other privatesector actors, and they play roles that serve the functions performed not just by Congress, but by
all three branches of government. New Governance scholars have emphasized the importance of
public-private hybrids, but government coercive force, resources, and coordination remain
important in New Governance scholarship. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A
Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 345 (1998) (describing
"[e]xperimentalist agencies dedicated to comparative evaluation of public and private actors"). In
contrast, private governance initiatives involve interactions between private parties that affect
issues commonly assigned to government but occur with little or no government involvement.
Private governance thus includes actions taken by nongovernmental entities that achieve
traditionally governmental ends such as managing the exploitation of common pool resources,
increasing the provision of public goods, setting labor or health standards, or reducing
environmental externalities. See infra Part I (discussing the genesis of private governance
initiatives).
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The private fairness doctrine would evaluate traditional and
new media firms not based on any particular media story or report,
which would be difficult and expensive to do on a timely basis, but based
on periodic evaluations of the systems the media organization has in
place to provide complete and accurate information. With the repeal of
the Fairness Doctrine by the Federal Communications Commission
("FCC") in 1987, the federal government stopped policing the fairness
and accuracy of information conveyed by radio and television stations. 9
The private fairness doctrine cannot solve the problem of channelized
information flows, but it can harness market and social pressure to
provide a partial substitute for the old public standard.
An existing or new broad, multistakeholder organization could
develop and implement the new private standard, following widely
adopted protocols developed for private standards and certification
systems.1 0 It could conduct transparent processes that produce, take
comment on, and periodically update the standard. Independent
auditors could perform the certification assessments. The content of the
new standard could be drawn from the earlier FCC standard, with
modifications to reflect developments in technology and lessons learned
from the FCC experience. The standard should seek greater accuracy
and completeness, but it should not seek balance. Although appealing
on the surface, balance can easily be manipulated to create a false sense
of equivalency on issues ranging from vaccination risks to climate
change." The certifications issued by this organization could solve
many of the information and coordination problems confronted by
advertisers and advocacy groups, enabling them to create and steer
market and social pressure toward media firms in a way that is now
done on a more limited and haphazard basis.
A brief example illustrates how the new private fairness doctrine
could function. An executive at a major retailer today may be faced with
competing demands from liberals and conservatives to stop advertising
on The Rachel Maddow Show or Laura Ingraham's "Ingraham Angle,"
yet the executive may lack the information necessary to know which
show is misstating or omitting key facts and may fear backlash from
the other side once a decision is announced. As to television and radio
stations, until 1987, the FCC's Fairness Doctrine provided some
See discussion infra notes 100-137 and accompanying text (discussing the FCC fairness
9.
doctrine in greater depth).
10. See, e.g., What are Credible Sustainability Standards?, ISEAL ALLIANCE,
https://www.isealalliance.org/credible-sustainability-standards/what-are-credible-sustainabilitystandards (last visited Apr. 1, 2020) [https://perma.cc/BP7Z-PFTM].
11. See discussion supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text (discussing polarization and its
distortive effects on information flows).
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constraints that the FCC enforced through the power of the federal
licensing process. 12 It may not be a coincidence that MSNBC and Fox
News were founded in the decade after the demise of the Fairness
Doctrine. 13 Similar issues arise with advertising on Facebook, Google,
Twitter, and other new media sources. The struggles of Facebook and
Twitter, in particular, to develop systems that address concerns about
bias and the accuracy of political and policy-relevant advertisements
have been the subject of substantial amounts of media coverage and
academic research.14
A private standards and certification organization could
evaluate the systems in place at each of the major traditional and new
media organizations and score them. Retailers could announce in
advance that they will only advertise on "A"-rated television and radio
programs and new media services, and their market power could then
motivate traditional and new media organizations to put the systems in
place necessary to achieve an "A" rating. Advocacy groups could also
draw on the certifications when conducting naming-and-shaming,
boycott, and other public-focused campaigns. The private fairness
doctrine could harness these private market and social forces, improve
the governance of private initiatives that target the media, and
ultimately improve the flow of information necessary for deliberative
democracy.
Why might the private fairness doctrine succeed? A growing
body of literature demonstrates how private governance initiatives are
performing the functions of government in the environmental, labor,
gun control, animal welfare, fair trade, and other areas.1 5 They often do
12. See discussion infra notes 100-137 and accompanying text.
13. See Jill Lepore,
The Hacking of America, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/14/sunday-review/politics-disruption-media-technology.html
[https://perma.cc/3TQA-72RX] (noting MSNBC and Fox were founded in 1996).
14. See Marjorie Heins, The Brave New World of Social Media Censorship, 127 HARV. L. REV.
FORUM 325, 326 (2014) (noting that Facebook's censorship rules curtail speech otherwise protected
by the First Amendment and "[u]nlike censorship decisions by government agencies, the process
in the private world of social media is secret"); Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People,
Rules, and Processes Governing Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1660 (2018) ("[P]latforms
play no significant role-yet-in determining whether content is true or false or whether coverage
is fair or unfair."); Rory Van Loo, The Corporationas Courthouse, 33 YALE J. REG. 547 (2016)
(discussing the use of consumer-driven complaints to police content); see also Kristen E.
Eichensehr, Digital Switzerlands, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 665 (2019) (discussing the extent to which
internet companies perform governmental functions). For a recent example of Facebook's efforts
to include outside experts to resolve and validate its decisions on advertising, see Tony Romm,
Facebook Unveils Charterfor Its 'Supreme Court,' Where Users Can Go to Contest the Company's
Decisions, WASH. POST (Sept. 17, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/09/17/
facebook-unveils-charter-its-supreme-court-where-users-can-go-contest-companys-decisions/
[https://perma.cc/LG9A-PQP4].
15. Scholars in many fields have explored how private organizations can perform
governmental functions, although they have used a variety of terms for the concept. See, e.g.,
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not achieve all of their goals 16 and are often a second-best option when
government action is not viable, but many have measurable effects on
firm behavior.1 7 A remarkable number and type of private initiatives
have emerged in recent years, and these private governance initiatives
are now common in the United States and around the globe. Studies by
political scientists, economists, and sociologists have examined why
they arise and the extent to which they are performing governmental
functions.1 8 For instance, more than ten percent of all fish caught for
human consumption around the world is subject to the private
standards set by the Marine Stewardship Council ("MSC"). 19 More than
eighty percent of the lending for project finance development around
the world is subject to the Equator Principles, private environmental
disclosure standards modeled on the National Environmental Policy
TIMOTHY D. LYTTON, KOSHER: PRIVATE REGULATION IN THE AGE OF INDUSTRIAL FOOD (2013)

&

(discussing the growth of private kosher certification agencies in the food industry); Kenneth W.
Abbott & Duncan Snidal, The Governance Triangle: Regulatory Standards Institutions and the
Shadow of the State, in THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL REGULATION 44 (Walter Mattli & Ngaire Woods
eds., 2009) (discussing the rise and function of alternative "governance arrangements," including
industry associations and NGOs); David P. Baron, Private Politics, Corporate Social
Responsibility, and Integrated Strategy, 10 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 7, 7 (2001) (proposing "a
theory of private politics in which an activist seeks to change the production practices of a firm for
the purpose of redistribution to those whose interests it supports"); Tim Bartley, Certifying Forests
and Factories:States, Social Movements, and the Rise of Private Regulation in the Apparel and
Forest Products Fields, 31 POL. & SOC'Y 433, 434-37 (2003) (introducing emergent systems of
private regulation in North American apparel and forest products sectors); Steven Bernstein
Benjamin Cashore, Can Non-State Global Governance be Legitimate?An Analytical Framework, 1
REG. & GOVERNANCE 347, 349-50 (2007) ("Where national and international regulation of
significant global social and environmental problems has been absent or weak, an array of
voluntary, self-regulatory, shared governance, and private arangements has begun to fill the policy
void."); Errol E. Meidinger, Environmental Certification Programsand U.S. Environmental Law:
Closer than You May Think, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10162, 10162 (2001) (listing several examples of
influential nongovernmental "environmental certification programs"); David Vogel, The Private
Regulation of Global Corporate Conduct, 49 BUS. & SOC'Y 68, 69-70 (2010) ("Global civil
regulation-voluntary, private, nonstate industry and cross-industry codes that specify the
responsibilities of global firms for addressing labor practices, environmental performances, and
human rights have become a highly visible and increasingly legitimate dimension of global
economic governance.").

16. See Jennifer Jacquet et al., Seafood Stewardship in Crisis, 467 NATURE 28, 29 (2010)
(discussing how "the incentives of the market have led [a seafood stewardship] certification scheme
away from its original goal, towards promoting the certification of ever-larger capital-intensive
operations").
&

17. See STEERING COMM. OF THE STATE-OF-KNOWLEDGE ASSESSMENT OF STANDARDS
CERTIFICATION, TOWARD SUSTAINABILITY: THE ROLES AND LIMITATIONS OF CERTIFICATION 9 (2012)
https://www.rainforest-alliance.org/sites/default/files/
[hereinafter TOWARD SUSTAINABILITY],

2016-08/toward-sustainability.pdf [https://perma.cc[BGT3-TE271 (discussing the "current market
status of key voluntary standards and certification systems").
18. See id. at 6-13 (discussing the emergence and function of private standards and
certification systems).

19. Rob Fletcher, MSC Sets 20 Percent Global Coverage Goal, FISH SITE (Oct. 5, 2017, 12:43
PM), https://thefishsite.com/articles/msc-sets-20-percent-global-coverage-goal_[https://perma.cc/
DEA3-KP82].
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Act ("NEPA") and managed by a private organization. 20 Although much
remains to be understood about these private governance initiatives,
they are proliferating, and research suggests that they can influence
the behavior of organizations and individuals even absent the coercive
power and resources of government. 21
A private standards and certification system could go wrong in
many ways. It could become captive of particular market, social or
political interests. 22 It could generate valuable assessments of media
processes but not generate sufficient market or social pressure to affect
media behavior. It could affect media behavior but not improve the
quality of the information used in political discourse and
decisionmaking. This Essay examines these concerns and concludes
that although they present genuine threats, the most important
question is how the private fairness doctrine would compare to the
likely alternatives: revival of government regulation or continued
muddling through without systematic, accountable oversight. The
former is highly unlikely, and if it occurs it may be worse than the
current situation. Ironically, a private standard, if carefully designed
and implemented, may produce a more democratically accountable
system than a government regulatory standard developed through

20. Equator Principles, FIRST FOR SUSTAINABILITY,
https://firstforsustainability.org/
sustainabilityexternal-initiatives/sustainability-frameworksequator-principles/ (last visited Apr.
1, 2020) [https://perma.cclKZM4-LWXQ]. Private standards use many of the same instruments
and address many of the same subject matter areas as the major federal environmental statutes.
See Sarah E. Light & Eric W. Orts, Parallelsin Public and Private Environmental Governance, 5
MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 1, 10 (2015) ("By 'parallel' we mean that private actors are adopting
similar techniques and methods as those that public regulators use to address environmental
problems. . . ."); Sarah E. Light & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance,
in II DECISION MAKING IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 253, 254 (LeRoy C. Paddock et al. eds., 2016)
(arguing that "private governance is an important source of environmental standards and
initiatives that both complement and compete with positive law").
21. See generally TOWARD SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 17 (explaining the proliferation of
voluntary labeling initiatives and certification standards and evaluating their effectiveness).
These private systems often draw on or increase existing financial and social motivations for
individuals and organizations to act. See Sarah E. Light, The Law of the Corporation as
EnvironmentalLaw, 71 STAN. L. REV. 137, 162 (2019) (noting that "[miarkets affect behavior by
making it more or less costly as a function of price, while norms affect behavior by making it more
or less costly as a result of social sanction or approbation"). Shifts in other areas of law may be
necessary to avoid consumer information overload and other barriers to private initiatives. See
David E. Adelman, Trademarks and Private Environmental Governance, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
709, 713 (2018) (discussing how "the technical nature of this information increases the risk of
information overload: the more ecolabels there are, the more information there is to process, and
the more likely consumers will be to use shortcuts (that savvy marketing can exploit) or to give up
entirely").
22. See Miriam Seifter, Complementary Separations of Power, 9 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 186,
187-89 (2016) (arguing that Congress is less vulnerable to "inequality and exclusion" than civil
society).
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current government processes or through government regulation or
other pressure as threatened by President Trump. 23
Private efforts thus far have taken important steps but have
been insufficient. Nonpartisan fact-checking organizations have
emerged, as have efforts to shame or boycott media companies based on
the perceived accuracy or fairness of the information they distribute.
Many of these initiatives have been short-term, ad hoc, single-issuefocused efforts, and they have had mixed success thus far. To be
effective, the new private fairness doctrine would need to have
widespread backing, legitimacy, and reach, but the beauty of a welldesigned private standards and certification system is that the
stakeholders who manage the system may be more responsive to public
preferences than politicians: the largest retail firms, institutional
investors, and nonprofit organizations have many limitations, but they
have incentives to reach large audiences and thus may be more
accountable to a broad swath of the population than are politicians. 24
Many large retail firms must appeal to a diverse, national, or global
customer base and cannot gerrymander their markets. Similarly, media
firms need a social license to operate in addition to various legal
licenses, and the certification provided by a private fairness doctrine
organization could serve as a proxy. 2 5 Defectors can voice their concerns

23. See, e.g., Alyza Sebenius & Ben Brody, Trump Says U.S. Should Sue Facebook, Google,
BLOOMBERG (June 26, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-06-26/trump-says-u-s(noting that
[https://perma.cc/2FHQ-7DQN]
should-sue-facebook-google-in-latest-complaint
President Trump has threatened a government suit against Facebook and Google); see also Chris
Hughes, It's Time to Break up Facebook, N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2019) https://www.nytimes.com/2019/
[https://perma.cc/64KM-D78U]
05/09/opinion/sunday/chris-hughes-facebook-zuckerberg.html
(suggesting government antitrust action against Facebook).
24. See discussion infra notes 55-61 (exploring the potential for private governance to guide
corporate behavior). An evaluation of the situations in which markets or government better reflect
public preferences is beyond the scope of this Essay. Cass Sunstein concludes that "market
ordering is undemocratic and that choices made through the political process are a preferable basis
for social ordering," but argues that
[a] generalization of this sort would be far too broad in light of the multiple breakdowns
of the political process and the advantages of market ordering in many arenas. But it
would also be a mistake to suggest, as some do, that markets always reflect individual
choice more reliably than politics, or that political choices differ from consumption
outcomes only because of confusion, as voters fail to realize that they must ultimately
bear the costs of the programs they favor.
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE 57-

69 (1990).
25. Neil Gunningham et al., Social License and Environmental Protection: Why Businesses
Go Beyond Compliance, 29 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 307, 308-10 (2004) (concluding that corporations
operate as though they need a social license to operate).
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to the supporters of the private standard or exit to form a competing
standard.26
Part I of this Essay briefly discusses the emergence of private
governance initiatives. It focuses on the common features of influential
private standards and certification systems and provides a simple
model explaining why they arise and why they can be effective. Part II
then examines how information flow problems exacerbate the
polarization that is undermining formal and informal democratic
processes. Part III proposes an initiative to develop, administer, and
enforce a private fairness doctrine and discusses objections and
extensions. It also notes that while this Essay focuses on the flow of
information, the concept of private governance can also stimulate
creative thinking about other core democratic processes, including
campaign finance, voting, and ballot security.27

I. PRIVATE GOVERNANCE MODELS
Private governance initiatives have proliferated in the last two
decades. These initiatives have performed governmental functions on a
wide range of important topics, including fisheries, forests, labor, fair
trade, gun control, organic food, animal welfare, and others. 28 This Part
explores why private governance initiatives emerge and how they
function, and it identifies critical elements for the design of the private
fairness doctrine.
Private governance organizations motivate behavior change
based on market, social, and private legal pressure rather than relying
on government taxes, subsidies, or regulations. Market and legal
influences are front and center in much of the legal literature, but it is
important not to underestimate the power of personal and social norms.
In recent decades, research in social psychology and sociology has
demonstrated that personal norms exert strong influence on behavior. 29
In other words, even if others cannot observe a behavior, if an individual
believes the behavior to be morally wrong, engaging in it can cause
feelings of guilt or anxiety that discourage the behavior. Individuals
26.
Cf. ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS,
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 4 (1970) (theorizing the "exit" and "voice" options whereby firm

management discovers its failings).
27. See, e.g., Ganesh Sitaraman, ContractingAround Citizens United, 114 COLUM. L. REV.
755, 758 (2014) (examining a private contract between Republican Scott Brown and Democrat
Elizabeth Warren to limit out-of-state political action committee ("PAC") campaign contributions).
28. See sources cited supra note 15 (examining how different private organizations perform
governmental functions).

29. See Paul C. Stern, Information,Incentives, and ProenvironmentalConsumer Behavior, 22
J. CONSUMER POL'Y 461, 464, 466 (1999).
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and organizations can activate the personal norms held by individuals,
inducing them to engage in behaviors that are consistent with their
norms. 30
In addition, scholars in political science, economics, sociology,
psychology, and other fields have explored the range of social influences
that affect the behavior of individuals and organizations. Even in the
absence of personal norms, people often respond to two types of social
norms:3 1 they tend to act as others think they should act (injunctive
norms) and in ways that they think others are acting (descriptive
norms). 32 This occurs even if no moral, social, economic, or legal
sanctions or rewards are likely to arise from the behavior. Research has
demonstrated that social norms are at least as influential as personal
norms and are easier to model. 33 The importance of personal and social
norms has induced leading social scientists to argue that corporations
not only need a legal license to operate, but also a social license to
operate. 34
Nobel Prize-winning research by Elinor Ostrom and colleagues
demonstrated how groups organize to manage collective resources even
absent government intervention. 35 Ostrom's work identified the
conditions that are often necessary for this form of private ordering to
succeed. Much of Ostrom's work focused on small groups, but scholars
30. Id. at 462-63 (citing Shalom H. Schwartz, Universals in the Content and Structure of
Values: TheoreticalAdvances and Empirical Tests in 20 Countries, 25 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL
Soc. PSYCHOL. 1, 54, 65 (1992)).
31. ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 11-35 (2000); Robert B. Cialdini, Carl A.

Kallgren & Raymond R. Reno, A Focus Theory of Normative Conduct: A Theoretical Refinement
and Reevaluation of the Role of Norms in Human Behavior, 24 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL Soc.
PSYCHOL. 201, 202-04 (1991).

32.

Cialdini et al., supra note 31, at 201-04. For a discussion in the legal literature, see

ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETILE DISPUTES (1991) (noting

that people largely govern themselves through social norms).
33. See ELLICKSON, supra note 32, at 124, 132; POSNER, supra note 31, at 34-35. For a
discussion in the political science literature, see ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE
EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 35-37 (1990); ELINOR OSTROM,
UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY 259 (2005); and Thomas Dietz, Elinor Ostrom & Paul

C. Stern, The Struggle to Govern the Commons, 302 SCI. 1907, 1908 (2003) (noting that effective
commons governance depends, in part, on "frequent face-to-face communication and dense social
networks [at the local level]-sometimes called social capital-that increase the potential for trust,
allow people to express and see emotional reactions to distrust, and lower the cost of monitoring
behavior and inducing rule compliance"); see also Oran R. Young, Building Regimes for
Socioecological Systems: Institutional Diagnostics, in INSTITUTIONS AND ENVIRONMENTAL
CHANGE: PRINCIPAL FINDINGS, APPLICATIONS, AND RESEARCH FRONTIERS 115, 123 (Oran R. Young,

Leslie A. King & Heike Schroeder eds., 2008) (discussing effective "self-contained" institutional
arrangements).

34. See Gunningham et al., supra note 25, at 308-10 (discussing the importance of social
licenses and how they can encourage companies to go beyond mere compliance in the context of
safety measures).
35. For a review, see Dietz, Ostrom & Stern, supra note 33, at 1907.

822

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:3:811

have also demonstrated how large, complex private institutions have
arisen to set and enforce standards in other settings. 36 Private
governance initiatives have led to the formation of private
organizations
that
perform the
types of standard-setting,
implementation, monitoring, enforcement, and dispute resolution
functions that are the bread and butter of government agencies. 37 These
private governance initiatives are not examples of the government
privatizing its functions or of public-private hybrids. 38 Instead,
government plays little or no role in the formation and operation of
these initiatives. The absence of government involvement distinguishes
private governance from privatization and public-private hybrids, and
the lack of dependence on government action is particularly important
when standard democratic processes break down. By untethering the
performance of governmental functions from government, private
governance initiatives can bypass the dysfunctions of government that
can arise from polarization, capture by special interests, and other
factors. 39
Some private initiatives focus explicitly on rewarding or
penalizing corporations and other organizations for their political
conduct, 40 but most private governance initiatives perform a function
36. See sources cited supra note 15 (examining how different private organizations perform
governmental functions).
37. See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 15, at 46-47 (discussing nonstate standards in
implementation, monitoring, and enforcement); Bernstein & Cashore, supra note 15, at 349-50
(identifying features of nonstate, market-driven governance systems).
38. The term private governance is not synonymous with privatization, which occurs when
the government contracts out governmental functions, such as with private prisons. Compare
GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (Jody Freeman & Martha

Minow eds., 2009) (discussing government outsourcing to private organizations), with
Vandenbergh, supra note 8, at 174 (exploring the "independent regulatory role often played by
private actors, not just public agencies or public-private hybrids"). In some cases, private
initiatives are developed in response to public laws, see Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Private Life
of Public Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2029, 2030-32 (2005), but private governance does not occur
because government outsourced its functions by contracting with private parties. Instead, it occurs
when private initiatives fill gaps in, complement, or compete with government activities.
39. The Georgia legislature's attempt to block Delta Airlines' efforts to support gun control
after the Parkland, Florida, shooting is an example of a government effort to prevent a company
from responding to widespread public preference. The Georgia legislature used state tax pressure
to push Delta Airlines to reinstate a benefit program for National Rifle Association ("NRA")
members. Richard Fausset, Georgia PassesBill that Stings Delta over N.R.A. Position,N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/01/business/delta-nra-georgia.html
[https://
perma.cc/WMQ6-VM4K. A second tactic is litigation to undercut private and quasi-governmental
initiatives. For instance, the NRA sued the New York state pension fund to prevent it from
disfavoring investments in gun manufacturers. Jacey Fortin, N.R.A. Suit Claims Cuomo's
'Blacklisting'Has Cost It Millions of Dollars, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.coml
2018/08/04/nyregion/nra-broke-financial-lawsuit.html [https://perma.cc/TC7P-2L67].
40. For instance, an organization called Buy Partisan allows individuals to make purchasing
decisions based on whether a firm's executives support Republicans or Democrats. See BUY
PARTISAN, http://buypartisan.com/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2020) [https://perma.cc/GT23-SFEX
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traditionally assigned to governments rather than explicitly attempting
to influence the political process. The environmental field has been one
41
with
of the most robust areas for private governance activity,
initiatives on topics ranging from climate mitigation to toxics regulation
to forest and fisheries management. 42 Private governance initiatives
have also developed on other topics. For instance, private initiatives are
taking a leading role in gun control: several retailers have adopted
restrictions on the sale of guns and ammunition, and other firms,
including Levi Strauss & Co. and Delta Airlines, have supported gun
restrictions. 43 Similarly, a deep literature has examined how Nike and
many other large retailers have set labor standards for clothing
manufacturers and has pointed out the successes and failures of those
efforts. 44 On animal welfare, firms ranging from Chipotle to McDonald's
to Chick-fil-A have set standards of care for the chickens and eggs they
buy from corporate suppliers. 4 5
(urging website visitors to "Scan. Discover. Decide. Shop according to your values"). The
organization offers a cell phone application that allows individuals to scan products to learn about
the donations by the firm or its executives. Similarly, an organization called 2nd Vote encourages
conservatives to use their purchasing power to push corporations to adopt conservative values and
2020)
1,
Apr.
visited
(last
https://www.2ndvote.com/
VOTE,
See 2ND
policies.
[https://perma.cc/735E-XSQ8]; see also Joel Ebert, Diane Black's Ties to Conservative Nonprofit
Raise Concerns About How She Would Treat Companies, TENNESSEAN (July 23, 2018),
https://www.tennessean.com/story/news/politics/tn-elections/2018/07/23/tn-governors-race-diane-

black-ties-conservative-nonprofit-2nd-vote-raise-concerns-elections/80045 1002/ [https://perma.cc/
8HWX-9HH8] (discussing 2nd Vote).
41. Vandenbergh, supra note 8, at 130-31; see also Upcoming Lautenberg Bill Could Be Key
Test for TSCA Reform This Congress, INSIDE EPA WKLY. REP., Apr. 1, 2011, at 6 (quoting Ernie
Rosenberg of the American Cleaning Institute for the proposition that "[t]he loss of public
confidence [in the public regulatory system means] we're going to increasingly have retailers that
are regulators, like Wal-Mart and Target").
42. The MSC sets sustainable fishery standards rather than trying to induce governments to
set standards. Its private standards regulate more than ten percent of all fish caught for human
consumption around the world. The Forest Stewardship

Council sets and enforces

private

sustainable forestry practices for roughly fifteen percent of all temperate forests. Vandenbergh,
supra note 8, at 148-50.
43. See Abha Bhattarai, Levi Strauss CEO Takes a Side on Gun Control: 'It's Inevitable that
We're Going to Alienate Some Consumers', WASH. POST (Sept. 10, 2018, 10:57 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2018/09/10/levi-strauss-ceo-takes-side-gun-control-itsinevitable-that-were-going-alienate-some-consumers/ [https://perma.cc/EBA4-V5KN]; discussion
supra note 39. For discussion of corporate responses to efforts by the NRA to block firearm
regulations, see Jackie Wattles, Delta and United Join List of Companies to Cut Ties with the NRA,
CNN (Feb. 24, 2018), http://money.cnn.com/2018/02/23/news/companies/enterprise-nra-car-rentaldiscounts/index.html [https://perma.ccY64Z-7Y9W]; and see also Andrew Ross Sorkin, How Banks
19, 2018),
Could Control Gun Sales if Washington Won't, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
[https://perma.cc/62MKhttps://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/19/business/banks-gun-sales.html
W2K6] (discussing how banks could lower weapon sales by refusing to do business with certain
gun shops).
44. For an early analysis, see Dara O'Rourke, Outsourcing Regulation: Analyzing
Nongovernmental Systems of Labor Standardsand Monitoring, 31 POL'Y STUD. J. 1, 7-10 (2003).
45. See Gina-Marie Cheeseman, Chipotle Rolls Out New Animal Welfare Standards for
Chickens, TRIPLE PUNDIT (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.triplepundit.com/2017/01/chipotle-new-
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Taken as a whole, the literature across multiple disciplines and
topics demonstrates how private organizations have used private
coercion and resources to serve traditionally governmental functions.
The point is not that these private initiatives have been uniformly
successful or beneficial. A number of these initiatives have achieved
demonstrable successes in changing the behavior of key actors or in
changing the targeted conditions, but some have had only limited
success, and others have failed outright (e.g., an effort to set a private
standard to limit the harvesting of tropical fish for household
aquariums).4 6 Rigorous empirical and theoretical research is needed to
assess how these private initiatives arise, whether they accomplish
their goals, how they should be evaluated as compared to government
actions, the spillover effects on government actions, and other issues.
The on-the-ground examples, empirical studies, and theoretical work to
date, though, demonstrate that private initiatives can play a proof-ofconcept role and can perform or complement governmental functions on
a wide range of topics.
The Equator Principles provide a potential model for the private
fairness doctrine. The Equator Principles are private standards that are
roughly analogous to NEPA, the federal statute that requires disclosure
of the human and environmental impacts of major federal decisions.
NEPA has become a model for many states and foreign governments,
but a large gap exists in the reach of NEPA and its public law
analogues. Roughly half of the states and most countries do not have a
NEPA-equivalent statute, and the federal NEPA requirements do not
apply to activities in the United States that do not involve a major
federal action.
In the 1990s, advocacy groups conducted naming-and-shaming
campaigns regarding the environmental harms arising from projects in
the developing world that were financed by major public and private
lenders. 47 These advocacy group campaigns induced the World Bank
and International Monetary Fund to develop guidelines regarding

animal-welfare-standard-chickens/ [https://perma.cc/5G2B-2ZUP]; Chick-fil-A to Source 100
Percent Cage-Free Eggs, CHICKEN WIRE (Mar. 9, 2016), https:/thechickenwire.chick-fila.com/News/Chick-fil-A-to-Source-100-Percent-Cage-Free-Eggs
[https://perma.cc/AM8M-6XWS];
McDonald's
Elevates
Chicken
Welfare
Standards,
QSR
(Oct.
30,
2017),
https://www.qsrmagazine.com/news/mcdonalds-elevates-chicken-welfare-standards
[https://perma.cc/C6C5-7AA9].
46.

For a review of these systems, see TOWARD SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 17.

47. See Nigel Clayton, The EquatorPrinciples and Social Rights: Incomplete Protection in a
Self-Regulatory World, 11 ENVTL. L. REV. 173, 185-87 (2009) (describing several examples of
nongovernmental organizations calling out banks for transparency, consultation, and
environmental issues related to projects in the developing world).
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environmental impacts and to reduce funding levels. 48 These efforts
also induced private banks to form the Equator Principles, private
standards that require the project developers to disclose and reduce the
environmental harms of the projects funded through project finance
loans. 49 Lenders representing more than eighty percent of global project
finance lending are now signatories to the Equator Principles. As with
the international, national, and subnational government disclosure
standards, the effects of the Equator Principles on the environmental
harms from covered projects are difficult to assess, but the private
requirements have substantially increased the disclosure of
environmental information for projects that otherwise would not be
50
subject to federal-, state-, or foreign-law disclosure requirements.
The Equator Principles standards share many common features
with the MSC standards for sustainable fisheries and other major
private sustainability standards. This is not by chance: stakeholders
and the funders who support these organizations have pushed for
processes that will enhance legitimacy. The result is a private
organization called ISEAL Alliance, which sets standards for private
standard-setting organizations.5 1 Common organizational components

48.

See,

e.g.,

Environmental

and

Social

Standards

(ESS),

WORLD

BANK,

https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/environmental-and-social-framework/brief/

environmental-and-social-standards (last visited Apr. 1, 2020) [https://perma.cc/GK89-QMX6);
IMF and the Sustainable Development Goals, INT'L MONETARY FUND (Feb. 26, 2020),
https://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2016/08/01/16/46/Sustainable-DevelopmentGoals [https://perma.cc/J9WQ-VMDX].
49. See The Equator Principles: June 2006, EQUATOR PRINCIPLES (2006), https://equator[https://perma.cc/CQ3Xprinciples.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/equator-principlesIl.pdf
VCRX] (describing the Equator Principles framework, "[a] financial industry benchmark for
determining, assessing, and managing social and environmental risk in project financing"); see
also Carbon Counts 2007: The Carbon Footprints of UK Investment Funds, TRUCOST (July 18,
2007), http://www.trucost.com/published-research/19/carbon-counts-2007-the-carbon-footprintsof-uk-investment-funds [https://perma.cclWCY9-BAS3] (ranking UK equity funds by their carbon
footprints).
50. See Ariel Meyerstein, Traasnational Private Financial Regulation and Sustainable
Development: An EmpiricalAssessment of the Implementation of the Equator Principles, 45 N.Y.U.
J. INT'L L. & POL. 487 (2013) (exploring how the impact of governance regimes can be measured);
Andrew Hardenbrook, Note, The Equator Principles: The Private FinancialSector's Attempt at
Environmental Responsibility, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 197 (2007) (analyzing whether the
Equator Principles are having a positive impact and achieving their goals in developing countries);
Marissa Marco, Note, Accountability in InternationalProjectFinance: The Equator Principlesand
the Creation of Third-Party-Beneficiary Status for Project-Affected Communities, 34 FORDHAM
IN'L L.J. 452 (2011).
51. See ISEAL ALLIANCE, https://www.isealalliance.org/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2020)
ISEAL has set several standards for standard-setting
[https://perma.cclQU48-UA7R].
organizations. ISEAL Credibility Principles, ISEAL ALLIANCE, https://www.isealalliance.org/
2020)
1,
(last visited Apr.
credible-sustainability-standardsiseal-credibility-principles
[https://perma.cc/RAQ7-5STF]; Setting Social and EnvironmentalStandards:ISEAL Code of Good
Practice, ISEAL ALLIANCE (2014), https://www.isealalliance.org/ sites/default/files/resource/2017-
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include a broad-based stakeholder group that plays a guiding or
advising role, a secretariat that administers the standards, and
mechanisms for enforcement and dispute resolution. The process for
producing and updating the standards often closely resembles the core
aspects of Administrative Procedure Act notice and comment
rulemaking: the organization publishes a draft standard, solicits
comments, responds to comments, modifies the standard, and
republishes it in final form. The Equator Principles are now in their
third iteration of this process. The MSC standards are updated in this
way on a periodic basis, 52 as are the FSC standards.5 3
Private government organizations deploy many of the same
instruments as are used in government regulation and address many of
the same topic areas. 54 Monitoring and enforcement mechanisms vary
but typically require some form of third-party auditing and use denial
of certification as the principal enforcement tool. Certification conveys
the imprimatur of the organization and enables a regulated firm to
easily communicate its status to the firm's stakeholders, whether
corporate or retail customers, advocacy groups, investors, lenders,
employee groups, or government regulators.
How can these types of private initiatives drive behavior change
among individuals, corporations, and other targets without the coercive
power or resources of government? The drivers of participation in
private governance initiatives are not fully understood and likely vary
across participants and initiatives, but research in several fields has
provided an initial snapshot. Private governance initiatives often arise
after advocacy groups have conducted naming-and-shaming campaigns
to induce companies to participate in the formation of the standards.5 5
Companies respond to these campaigns for a complex mix of reasons
that likely include concerns that the advocacy groups will be able to
stimulate shifts in market behavior (e.g., actions by consumers,
employees, managers, investors, and lenders) or nonmarket social
behavior (e.g., pressure from individuals and religious, university, civic,

11/ISEAL Standard SettingCode-v6 Dec_2014.pdf
Credible SustainabilityStandards?,supra note 10.
52.

MSC

Standard

Setting

Procedure,

[https://perma.cc/795P-UC9U];

MARINE

STEWARDSHIP

What are

COUNCIL

(2018),

https://www.msc.org/docs/default-source/default-document-library/msc-standard-settingprocedure.pdf [https://perma.cc/KX4Q-VEHT].
53. FSC-STD-60-006: Process Requirements for the Development and Maintenance of
National

Forest

Stewardship

Standards,

FOREST

STEWARDSHIP

COUNCIL

(2009),

https://ic.fse.org/en/document-center/id/88 [https://perma.cc/4S9X-URT3].
54. Light & Orts, supra note 20, at 1; Light & Vandenbergh, supra note 20.
55. See Michael P. Vandenbergh & Johnathan A. Gilligan, Beyond Gridlock, 40 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 217, 264-65 (2015) (discussing how environmental advocacy groups targeted major
banks with naming-and-shaming campaigns).
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and cultural organizations). Funding for private governance initiatives
is often provided by one or more philanthropic organizations, and an
ongoing funding mechanism is often incorporated into the certification
process. A core vulnerability of these systems is that the source of initial
or ongoing funding can compromise the independence of the
organization. Once the standards and certification organization is
established and standards are in place, the organization may induce
compliance by harnessing the same market and social forces that were
used to form the organization.
In many cases these private initiatives may steer behavior even
when governments are unable to act because it is often easier for
individuals to express their preferences through market and social
mechanisms than through formal democratic processes. For instance, it
may be easier for consumers to choose between two stores at the same
shopping center, two goods on the same shelf, or two investment options
for retirement funds than it is to vote, call a legislator, or contribute to
a candidate. Not surprisingly, in many of the areas in which private
governance initiatives have arisen, government actions or failures to
act have been out of sync with the preferences of a large segment of the
population (e.g., gun control, animal welfare, climate mitigation).
Market and social pressure can be stimulated at low cost by
nongovernmental organizations (e.g., advocacy groups, service groups,
and civic, cultural and religious organizations) because new
technologies and social media facilitate the ability of these
organizations to gather, process, and spread information. For instance,
a cell phone can scan products in a grocery store to reveal everything
from the environmental footprint of the good to health and safety
information. 56 Individuals may use the information not only to affect
retail purchases, but also investments, decisions about where to work,
and other actions.
Although most consumers in the United States are not willing
to pay a premium for green goods, they will often opt for green goods
over others if the price is comparable. 5 7 In addition, although the effects
of reputation on corporate behavior are difficult to study, many
corporate actions regarding fisheries, forests, climate, and other issues
may be driven more by concern about corporate brand than by specific

56. See, e.g., GOODGUIDE, https://www.goodguide.com/#/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2020)
[https://perma.ccl5DKM-ALKW] (rating over seventy-five thousand products based on their health
and safety characteristics).
57. See Mark Cohen & Michael P. Vandenbergh, The PotentialRole of Carbon Labeling in a
Green Economy, 34 ENERGY ECON. S53, S55-S56 (2012) (reviewing market studies).
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consumer choices.58 Firms are keen to develop and protect their
reputation out of concern that consumers will not even consider buying
their products if they have a negative view of the firm's brand.5 9 Thus,
even if direct consumer behavior change does not drive the behavior of
the major retail firms that spend large amounts of advertising dollars,
brand reputation may have a powerful influence. In addition, niche
retailers can market to small groups, but large retailers cannot succeed
unless they can maintain their reputation among a very broad share of
the population.6 0 That may explain a wide range of otherwise puzzling
behavior by firms, such as why a company like Dick's Sporting Goods
banned the sale of AR-15 rifles despite strong opposition from gun
advocates.6 1
The magnitude of the pressure from lenders and investors is
easy to underestimate, but a few examples suggest why this pressure
may be influencing the behavior of many large corporations. The
Equator Principles are the most prominent example of the ways in
which lenders have used their market power regarding environmental
and climate issues, but lenders are also participating in other similar
initiatives. 62 Equity investors are also playing an important role. For
instance, investment firms with more than $100 trillion in assets under
management are part of the CDP (formerly the Carbon Disclosure
Project), which encourages companies to disclose and reduce carbon
emissions. The largest institutional investment firm in the world,
BlackRock, has adopted a low-carbon policy and has begun enforcing
the policy through its investment decisions and proxy voting. 63 Many
58.

Sharon Shewmake et al., Carbon Triage: A Strategy for Developing a Viable Carbon

Labelling System, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON SUSTAINABLE CONSUMPTION 285, 289 (Lucia A.

Reisch & John Thogersen eds., 2015). For overviews of research on corporate reputation, see
DANIEL DIERMEIER, REPUTATION RULES: STRATEGIES FOR BUILDING YOUR COMPANY'S MOST

VALUABLE ASSET (2011); and Wayne B. Gray & Jay P. Shimshak, The Effectiveness of
Environmental Monitoring and Enforcement: A Review of the Empirical Evidence, 5 REV. ENVTL.
ECON. & POLY 3 (2011).
59. See sources cited supranote 58.
60. Miriam Seifter has noted that civil society is more able to provide checks and balances at
a national rather than subnational level. Miriam Seifter, Furtherfrom the People? The Puzzle of
State Administration, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 107 (2018).
61. See Mystica M. Alexander & Scott R. Thomas, Rogue Retailers or Agents of Necessary
Change? Using CorporatePolicy as a Tool to Regulate Gun Ownership, 166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE
283 (2018). The desire to appeal to the preferences of the majority or a large plurality of the
population may also be the motivation for gun control actions by Levi Strauss, see Bhattarai, supra
note 43, and Nike's recent advertising campaign focusing on Colin Kaepernick, see Patrick Coffee,
How Nike's $6 Billion Colin Kaepernick Campaign Put the Focus Back on Big Creative Ideas,
ADWEEK (Sept. 30, 2018), https://www.adweek.com/agencies/the-big-payback/ [https://perma.cc/
QLW6-RPFC].
62.

VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, supra note 4.

63. See Tim Quinn & Lex Suvanto, 10 Signs that Some of the World's Most Powerful Money
Managers Are Worrying More About Climate Change, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 7, 2018, 3:59 PM),
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other institutional investors and pension funds have done the same. In
addition, recent research suggests that the holdings of the biggest
institutional investors such as BlackRock, State Street and Vanguard
are so large and depend so much on gains over the next five to twenty
years that they have incentives to adopt an economy-wide and longterm perspective. 64 Other investor sectors are engaging in this type of
behavior as well. For instance, one of the largest private equity firms in
the United States, the Carlyle Group, has hired a former
Environmental Defense Fund manager as its Chief Sustainability
Officer, adopted a policy of carbon neutrality for its operations, and
5
committed to drive down the emissions from its portfolio companies. 6
Pressure from lenders and investors may be a contributing
the rapid uptake of many types of environmental supply-chain
in
factor
requirements over the last several decades. Walmart has worked with
environmental groups such as the Environmental Defense Fund to
reduce emissions from its suppliers by more than twenty-eight million
tons and has committed to achieve a billion tons by 2030.66 These are
only anecdotal examples, but an empirical study of the largest firms in
each of eight corporate sectors found that over half of the firms in each

https://www.businessinsider.com/vanguard-blackrock-and-exxonmobil-worry-about-climate-

(noting that BlackRock "listed climate risk
change-2018-2 [https://perma.cc/3KU4-RZGG]
disclosure practices among its top 'engagement priorities'"); Reuters, BlackRock Says Investors
2016),
6,
(Sept.
Investing, FORTUNE
Climate Change When
to Assess
Need
http://fortune.com/2016/09/06/blackrock-climate-change/ [https://perma.cc/EU7T-DZQW]; see also
Press Release, The Carlyle Grp., The Carlyle Group Releases 2018 Corporate Citizenship Report
https://www.carlyle.com/media-roomnews-release-archive/carlyle-group2018),
12,
(June
releases-2018-corporate-citizenship-report [https://perma.cc/KG6W-AX5V] (announcing that The
Carlyle Group, a private equity firm, is carbon neutral). Similarly, seventy-four percent of the U.S.
population supports legal status for illegal immigrants brought to the United States as children,
yet it was universities and employers that took action to protect Deferred Action for Childhood
Arrivals recipients. Maria Sacchetti, University, Employers Scramble to Protect DACA Recipients,
CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 23, 2018, 1:08 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-biz-universityAlec
[https://perma.cc/TNW7-VS4A];
employers-protect-daca-recipients-20180223-story.html
Tyson, Public Backs Legal Status for Immigrants Brought to U.S. Illegally as Children, but Not a
Bigger Border Wall, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 19, 2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2018/01/19/public-backs-legal-status-for-immigrants-brought-to-u-s-illegally-as-childrenbut-not-a-bigger-border-wall [https:/perma.cc/8UCN-TUVU].
64. Madison Condon, Externalities and the Common Owner, WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming
2020); Jon D. Harford, Firm Ownership Patternsand Motives for Voluntary Pollution Control, 18
MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 421 (1997).

65. Press Release, supra note 63.
66. Walmart Launches New Reusable Bag Campaign;Announces 93 Million Metric Tons of
Supplier Emission Reductions through Project Gigaton and Announces New Sustainable Textile
Goals, WALMART (Apr. 10, 2019), https://corporate.walmart.com/newsroom/2019/04/10/walmartlaunches-new-reusable-bag-campaign-announces-93-million-metric-tons-of-supplier-emissionreductions-through-project-gigaton-and-announces-new-sustainable-textile-goals
[https://perma.cc/H4VM-P46Q].
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sector imposed environmental requirements on suppliers.6 7 These
supply-chain restrictions are not mandated by federal, state, or local
environmental laws, but they enable environmental pressure to be
transferred to small- and medium-sized firms in the United States and
around the globe.
In short, the private governance initiatives that have emerged
in the last several decades demonstrate that private organizations are
performing many types of governmental functions. These organizations
often develop as a result of shared interests among advocacy groups and
corporations,
with
seed
funding
from
philanthropists.
The
organizations enforce their standards through informal and formal
market and social pressure, and they include several common design
elements. Although the research base is thin, studies suggest that these
organizations often succeed at shifting the behavior of their regulatory
targets.6 8 Whether they achieve their ultimate objectives (e.g.,
improving environmental conditions, labor conditions, or prices paid to
farmers for fair trade goods) is less well understood, but it is important
to note that the same can be said for many government programs on the
same topics. Private systems can become captured by economic, social,
or political interests, but the important question for this Essay is
whether a private fairness doctrine can be developed that is sufficiently
influential to shift the behavior of media firms and sufficiently
accountable to a broad group of stakeholders to avoid capture by narrow
interests. I explore these issues in Parts II and III.

II. INFORMATION PROBLEMS
A private fairness doctrine is important because concerns exist
not only about the ability of government to perform the traditional
functions assigned to governments (e.g., providing public goods and
reducing negative externalities), but also about the health of basic
democratic processes. 69 The flow of information is perhaps the most
67. Michael P. Vandenbergh, The New Wal-Mart Effect: The Role of Private Contractingin
Global Governance, 54 UCLA L. REV. 913 (2007); see also Rory Van Loo, The New Gatekeepers:
PrivateFirms as Public Enforcers, 106 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (noting the extent to which
government statutes and regulations require enforcement through private supply-chain
contracts).
68.

See TOWARD SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 17.

69. Yascha
Mounk, America Is Not a Democracy, ATLANTIC
(Mar.
2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/03/america-is-not-a-democracy/550931/
[https://perma.cclBXZ2-VEJF]. The moderate-to-conservative Democratic Blue Dog Coalition once
had fifty-four members and now only has twenty-five. Andrew Kacynzki & Christopher Massie,
Arizona Senate: Krysten Sinema's Anti-war Group Blasted 'U.S. Terror,' Depicted Soldier as
Skeleton in 2003 Flyers, CNN (Sept. 15, 2018, 4:41 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/09/15/
politics/kfile-sinema-flyers/index.html
[https://perma.cclJW63-HY86]; Members, BLUE DOG
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fundamental process for a successful democracy. Social, market, and
legal developments over the last several decades have distorted the flow
of information in a variety of ways that undermine opportunities for
informed policymaking. I focus on two developments that contribute to
the information problem and may be amenable to a new private
response: (1) the channelization of information flow through traditional
and new media firms and the effects of this channelization on
polarization and social checks and balances, and (2) the withdrawal of
the federal government from even the most basic policing of the flow of
information conveyed by the media.
Channelized Information Flow. The first development arises
from the shifting structure and motivations of traditional and new
media. Adequate information is essential for democratic participation
and deliberation, but there is a growing recognition that the flow of
politically relevant information in the United States is flawed.7 0 In a
world in which government checks and balances are the principal focus,
government censorship of the media is a core concern. Of course, the
Framers' response was the First Amendment, which is designed to
encourage uninhibited and robust debate by imposing constraints on
the ability of governments, not private organizations, to restrict free
speech.7 1 The assumption is that lack of government constraints on
speech will yield an informed, participatory public citizenry and
adequate information for politicians and other policymakers. 72
The assumption underlying this approach to free speech is that
multiple tongues will reach multiple ears. 73 But what happens if they
do not? What happens if those ears can be closed to all tongues other
than those with prescreened messages? In recent years, the flow of
information has been distorted in ways that undermine opportunities
for informed democratic discourse across deeply held worldviews. In
1980, three major networks dominated television, and a small number
of national broadcast networks dominated radio as well. (Newspaper
content was less concentrated, but newspapers had widespread
(last visited
COALITION, https://bluedogcaucus-costa.house.gov/members
[https://perma.cc/7Q92-CVBZ] (listing members of the Blue Dog Coalition).
70.

Apr.

1,

2020)

See generally SUNSTEIN, #REPUBLIC, supra note 1 (discussing how the channelization of

information flows has become pervasive in the last several decades). For a recent discussion in the
mass media, see Lepore, supra note 13.
71. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (Brennan, J.).
72. As Justice Brennan stated, "The First Amendment must therefore safeguard not only the
right of the public to hear debate, but also the right of individuals to participatein that debate and
to attempt to persuade others to their points of view." Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic
Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 193 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
73. As Judge David Bazelon noted, "The wisdom of the First Amendment is, however, that a
multitude of tongues will produce the diversity of ideas and artistic achievement we all desire."
David L. Bazelon, FCC Regulation of the Telecommunications Press, 1975 DUKE L.J. 213, 241.
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readership across the political spectrum in many communities.) In
short, television and radio stations were owned by many different
parties, but a small group of broadcasting firms dominated the field.
The concentration among broadcasters raised concerns about private
censorship. 7 4 To succeed, though, these broadcast networks needed to
appeal to widespread audiences. In turn, this motivated broadcasters
to convey information that not only might be homogenized or dumbed
down, but also that could withstand scrutiny from and attract a broad
audience. In other words, broadcast firms had incentives to integrate
the views of and retain the credibility of many people across the political
spectrum. 75
This had all changed by the late 1990s, when Fox News and
MSNBC were commanding a substantial share of the national
audience. The growth of cable television, satellite radio, and other
options enabled the traditional media firms to generate a large number
of information pathways or channels. The new channels often targeted
self-selected subgroups and only reached large audiences in the
aggregate. In contrast, between 1980 and 2005, the share of the
television market reached by the nightly news of the three major
networks that ostensibly attempted to reach a general audience fell
from 42.3 million to 18.9 million. 76 The result is that many media firms
faced little incentive to generate or provide content that could survive
scrutiny from or appeal to a wider audience.7 7

74. See Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press-A New FirstAmendment Right, 80 HARV. L.
REV. 1641 (1967) [hereinafter Barron, Access to the Press] (arguing that First Amendment theory
must be reexamined to respond to mass media's repression of ideas); see also Jerome A. Barron,
Access to the Media-A Contemporary Appraisal, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 937, 938 (2007) [hereinafter
Barron, Access to the Media] (stating that in his 1967 article he "wanted the law to respond to the
reality of private censorship by affording opportunities for access and reply").
75. Jill LePore's work suggests that the period of low polarization after the Second World
War was an anomaly. See LEPORE, supra note 2, at 545-46 (noting higher levels of polarization
eventually followed Truman's election). The difference now, though, is that many of the other
institutions and opportunities for interactions have diminished or become polarized as well. For a
discussion of the pervasive polarization in the United States today, see generally TALISSE, supra
note 2.
76. Network
Evening News
Ratings,
PEW
RES.
CTR.
(Mar.
13,
2006),
http://www.journalism.org/numbers/network-evening-news-ratings/

[https://perma.cc/CC9S-

JTS4]; see also Evening News Viewership, All Networks, PEW RES. CTR. (Mar. 12, 2007),
http://www.journalism.org/numbers/evening-news-viewership-all-networks/

[https://perma.cc/5JHP-FCB5] (showing network evening news viewership has declined from 52.1
million in 1980 to 26.1 million in 2006).
77. See Philip Bump, How Polarizationand SplinteredMedia Are Fosteringa World ofDoubt,
WASH. POST (Nov. 13, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2017/11/13/howpolarization-and-splintered-media-are-fostering-a-world-of-doubt/ [https://perma.cc/FLU8-UQSU]
(explaining that Fox News's ratings have improved largely due to its reembrace of partisan
politics).
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By 2010, the development of the internet and social media had
reinforced the tendency toward tailored information flows. The growth
of new media giants reduced the number of firms that provide pathways
for information (e.g., Facebook, Google, and Twitter), 78 leading to
censorship concerns. 79 Although the concentration of these firms poses
risks of private censorship, an equal or greater concern is that these
firms enable users to avoid exposure to opinions and assertions of fact
that are inconsistent with the users' worldview. Participants can speak
all they want but also can insulate themselves from inconvenient views.
This undermines debate, deliberation, and compromise. Facebook,
Google, Twitter, and other firms that serve as information conduits to
general audiences can affect this flow of information and are thus
subject to pressure from all sides. Not surprisingly, these firms have
struggled to develop and implement corporate content standards and
implementing systems.8 0
In short, although information sources have become more
numerous, they also have become more tailored to specific audiences.
78. See generally Barron, Access to the Media, supra note 74 (reflecting on the advent of the
internet and its significance for private rights of access). The Fairness Doctrine may serve as a
useful analogy in imagining a solution to this issue. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,
400-01 (1969) (holding the doctrine constitutional because it was in the public interest to promote
access to scarce radio frequencies); Jerome A. Barron, The Federal Communications Commission's

FairnessDoctrine: An Evaluation, 30 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1961); Jerome A. Barron, In Defense
Doctrine, 37 U. COLO. L.
of 'Fairness"- A FirstAmendment Rationale for Broadcasting's "Fairness"
REV. 31 (1964) (concluding that the Fairness Doctrine "represents a modest attempt to
affirmatively structure at least one communications medium so that the first amendment mandate
is not allowed to become, due to rapid economic and technological change, irrelevant"); Roscoe L.
Barrow, The FairnessDoctrine:A Double Standardfor Electronic and Print Media, 26 HASTINGS
L.J. 659 (1975) (assessing the different applications of the Fairness Doctrine between broadcast
and print media); Louis L. Jaffe, The EditorialResponsibility of the Broadcaster:Reflections on
Fairnessand Access, 85 HARV. L. REV. 768 (1972) (arguing that the fairness and access doctrines,
while beneficial, must be limited to avoid impinging on other important values); Thomas G.
Krattenmaker & L.A. Powe, Jr., The FairnessDoctrine Today: A Constitutional Curiosity and an
Impossible Dream, 1985 DUKE L.J. 151 (concluding that the Fairness Doctrine is incoherent and
unworkable).
79.

For instance, Jerome Barron has stated that "given contemporary anemic views of what

constitutes state action, the major Internet service providers have enormous discretion. . . . Should
the very small number of companies that own major Internet platforms and search engines be
viewed as state actors so that they will be subject to First Amendment restraints?" Barron, Access
to the Media, supra note 74, at 953.
80. For a discussion of these struggles, see Klonick, supra note 14. The content policies of
Twitter and Facebook are a form of self-regulation. See id. at 1599. The private fairness doctrine
would be a form of private governance, not self-regulation, however, because it would involve
private standards that are developed and enforced by third parties, not simply the internal policies
of a firm. Controversy over Facebook's decision not to ban false political advertisements is just one
example of the difficulty new media firms are confronting as they develop self-regulatory policies.
See Craig Timberg, Tony Romm & Drew Harwell, A Facebook Policy Lets PoliticiansLie in Ads,
Leaving Democrats Fearing What Trump Will Do, WASH. POST (Oct. 10, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/10/10/facebook-policy-political-speech-letspoliticians-lie-ads/ [https://perma.cc/PLD6-GDZT].
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Information is generated and flows not to general audiences, but
instead is generated to appeal to a specific group and is conveyed to that
group, often without easy access by others outside the group.81 As new
forms of communication have developed, the number of avenues
through which media companies can reach audiences has exploded,
leading to a market in which media organizations with an explicit
ideological agenda have substantially increased their share of the
audience. Individuals can now insulate themselves from facts and
opinions that .are inconsistent with their worldview, preselecting the
information they want to be exposed to, and perhaps more importantly,
the information they want to ignore. 82 This channelization of
information flow also undermines the need for reporters, editors, and
other content providers to account for reactions and fact checking from
a broad audience.
The channelization of information works in tandem with several
aspects of human psychology to facilitate political polarization. 83 For
instance, individuals engage in confirmation bias and motivated
reasoning, picking those sources of information and factual assertions
that fit with their worldview and tossing out those that do not. 84 These
processes even affect how individuals experience the surroundings of
their daily lives-conservatives in rural northern New England believe
that recent winters have been colder than they have been, making it
easier to dismiss concerns about climate change.8 5 In theory, interacting
with others who have different viewpoints could ameliorate this
problem, but increasingly in the United States individuals only
associate-both physically and electronically-with similar others. 86 In
81. See Natalie Jomini Stroud, Polarization and PartisanSelective Exposure, 60 J. COMM.
556, 556 (2010) (discussing how "people purposefully select information matching their viewpoints"
and tend to be attracted to sources of media that align with their opinions).
82. See Bump, supra note 77 (analyzing the growth of political polarization in conjunction
with the splintering of media sources); Stroud, supra note 81, at 556-57 (examining the effects of
partisan selective exposure on political polarization and vice versa); Amy Mitchell et al., Political
Polarization & Media Habits, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 21, 2014), http://www.journalism.org/
2014/10/21/political-polarization-media-habits/
[https://perma.cc/VY85-B8H5]
(surveying the
media consumption habits of people on different ends of the political spectrum).
83. For an overview of these phenomena regarding acceptance of climate science, see
generally VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, supranote 4.

84. See id. at 9.
85. See Lawrence C. Hamilton et al., Cold Winters Warming? Perceptionsof Climate Change
in the North Country, 10 WEATHER, CLIMATE, & SOC'Y 641, 646 (2018) (showing that Democrats,
Independents, and non-Tea Party Republicans recognize winter warming while Tea Party
members do not); see also Elke U. Weber, Perception and Expectation of Climate Change, in
ENVIRONMENT, ETHICS, AND BEHAVIOR 314, 318-38 (Max H. Bazerman et al. eds., 1997) (studying
Iowan farmers and finding those that believed in global warming "tended to cite more sources as
having influenced their opinion than those who did not").
86. See generally TALISSE, supra note 2 (discussing growing polarization across multiple
domains in the United States).
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turn, associating with similar others reinforces and increases extreme
views, and research shows that people engage in belief superiority: the
more extreme their views, the more they think their views are superior
to others.8 7
Polarization. Not surprisingly, polarization has increased in
recent years both in the general population and among politicians. The
literature on polarization is extensive, but one example demonstrates
the extent of the difference between Democrats and Republicans in
Congress. Sociologist Aaron McCright and colleagues have examined
the League of Conservation Voters ("LCV") scores of members of
Congress regarding important environmental issues over the last
several decades, and the results are striking: in the years following
1990, a massive gap opened up in the LCV scores of Democrats and
Republicans. 8 8 Although polarization was always a feature of
environmental voting in Congress, the gap expanded rapidly after 1992
and is now almost at its maximum possible extent.8 9 Similar analyses
have been conducted on issues ranging from healthcare, to choice or
abortion, to gun control.9 0
The gap between Democrats and Republicans undermines the
ability to share information and form policy compromises. 9 ' For
instance, in the environmental field, almost two dozen major pollution
control statutes were adopted through the Clean Air Act Amendments
of 1990, but that process largely ground to a halt as polarization
increased during the 1990s, and in the quarter century since 1990 only
one major pollution control statute has been adopted. 92 Other factors

87. See Kaitlin Toner, Mark R. Leary, Michael W. Asher & Katrina P. Jongman-Sereno,
Feeling Superior Is a Bipartisan Issue: Extremity (Not Direction) of Political Views Predicts
PerceivedBelief Superiority, 24 PSYCHOL. SCI. 2454, 2459 (2013) ("[P]eople at the extremes of the
political spectrum felt most superior about their beliefs.").
88. See McCright et al., supra note 3, at 252-53 (illustrating the widening partisan divide in
environmental voting scores).
89. See id.
90. See, e.g., Edward G. Carmines, Jessica C. Gerrity & Michael W. Wagner, How Abortion
Became a PartisanIssue: Media Coverageof the Interest Group-PoliticalParty Connection, 38 POL.
& POL'Y 1135, 1135-36 (2010) (analyzing the increase in the partisan divide over abortion); Frank
Newport & Andrew Dugan, PartisanDifferences Growing on a Number of Issues, GALLUP (Aug. 3,
https://news.gallup.com/opinion/polling-matters/215210/partisan-differences-growing2017),
number-issues.aspx [https://perma.cc/A4U9-E8M4].
91. See Sarah A. Binder, The Dynamics of Legislative Gridlock, 1947-96, 93 AM. POL. SCl.
REV. 519, 521 (1999) ("The broader the distribution of preferences, the greater the likelihood that
legislators' goals will be incompatible, or at least the more difficult it will be to reach a suitable
compromise.").

92. Vandenbergh, supra note 8, at 131; see Michael P. Vandenbergh et al., Lamarck Revisited:
The Implications of Epigenetics for Environmental Law, 7 MICH. J. ENvTL. & ADMIN. L. 1, 28-29
(2017) (discussing the Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st Century Act, Pub. L. No.
114-182, 130 Stat. 448 (2016)).
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certainly played a role in this legislative gridlock, but polarization was
an important factor. 93
Social Checks and Balances. Scholars have noted the importance
of social checks and balances for some time, but the term has been used
in a narrow sense to refer to the constraints on politicians, party
leaders, and other active participants in the political process arising
from norms of fair play. For instance, in the 1950s, political scientist
Robert Dahl emphasized the importance of social influences but noted
that "[b]ecause we are taught to believe in the necessity of
constitutional checks and balances, we place little faith in social checks
and balances." 94 Recent scholarship has focused on the importance of
parties rather than branches of government in the constitutional
system of checks and balances, 95 but the growing party-based
polarization has also undermined social checks and balances. As Dahl
noted, "In the absence of certain social prerequisites, no constitutional
arrangements can produce a non-tyrannical republic," and "an increase
in the extent to which one of the social prerequisites is present may be
far more important in strengthening democracy than any particular
constitutional design." 96 In his writing about social checks and

.

93. Binder, supra note 91, at 527.
94. DAHL, supra note 5, at 83. As Dahl noted, Madison "was not indifferent to the necessary
social conditions for his non-tyrannical republic. But surely it is not unfair to say that his primary
concern was with prescribed constitutional controls. . . with constitutional checks and balances
rather than social checks and balances." Id. at 82. According to Dahl, "The men at the Convention
took human nature and social structure largely for granted; their job, as they interpreted it, was
to create a constitution most fully consonant both with human nature and social structure . .
Id. In Federalist 51, Madison stated:
A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but
experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions. This policy of
supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the defect of better motives, might be traced
through the whole system of human affairs, private as well as public. We see it
particularly displayed in all the subordinate distributions of power, where the constant
aim is to divide and arrange the several offices in such a manner as that each may be a
check on the other-that the private interest of every individual may be a sentinel over
the public rights.
THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2016). Although Madison
seemed to understand the role of checks and balances in each sphere (public and private), as Dahl
noted he did not focus on the extent to which the one sphere (private) can contribute checks and
balances to the other (public). DAHL, supranote 5, at 83.
95. Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 2312,2312-14 (2006). While the experience with one-party control of Congress and the White
House during the January 2017 to January 2019 period was consistent with the parties-not-powers
thesis, institutional loyalties may play a greater role than Levinson and Pildes acknowledged,
particularly in executive-judicial branch interactions. See David Fontana & Aziz Z. Huq,
InstitutionalLoyalties in ConstitutionalLaw, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 1-10 (2018) (noting that recent
scholarship gives the idea of institutional loyalties short shrift).
96. DAHL, supra note 5, at 83. In developing his theory of polyarchy, Dahl asserted that
"[w]hether we are concerned with tyranny by a minority or tyranny by a majority,... the first and
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balances, Dahl focused on the importance of the widely shared norms of
the active participants in the political process: politicians, party
leaders, and to a lesser extent, voters. For instance, politicians in the
two major parties understood that they would be in and out of power
with one another, and this iterative process induced a tacit agreement
not to overreach or manipulate certain rules when in power.9 7 These
informal understandings were certainly not followed in all cases, but
they constrained the behavior of many of the politicians and other
participants in the political process. As a result, even in a government
of parties, not powers, Dahl's social checks and balances buttressed the
democratic processes institutionalized by the Framers. 98
In their simplest form, social checks and balances arise from the
enforcement of personal and social norms. In Dahl's use of the term
social checks and balances, this social pressure occurs among the active
participants in the political process-such as politicians and party
activists. Informal, noninstitutionalized social pressure arises when
private citizens praise or shame political figures. 99 In the absence of
crucial variables to which political scientists must direct their attention are social and not
constitutional." Id.
97. Id. Dahl used the term "social checks and balances" in his explanation of his theory of
polyarchy, but he focused principally on how social and personal norms among the participants in
the political process (e.g., common practices or informal rules about fair play in elections held by
politicians, party officials, and others) affect the structure and function of the branches of
government. See ROBERTA. DAHL, POLYARCHY: PARTICIPATION AND OPPOsITION (1971) (providing
an overview of his theory of polyarchy); DONALD J. LEE, POLYARCHY: THE POLITICAL THEORY OF

ROBERT A. DAHL 13 (1991) (describing the social norm between leaders and nonleaders as a key
characteristic of polyarchy). I use the term more broadly to also describe how private activity can
provide social checks and balances that occur among individuals and organizations that operate
largely outside of and parallel to the political process, rather than among the party leaders,
politicians, and other direct participants in the political process.
98. In recent years, scholars and pundits have noted that democratic personal and social
norms are an essential complement to institutional structures and may be more fundamental to a

successful democracy, although the focus has remained principally on the norms of politicians and
party activists. See, e.g., LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra note 6, at 9 (describing informal norms as "the
soft guardrails of democracy"); Claire Cain Miller & Kevin Quealy, Democracy in America: How Is
It Doing?, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/23/upshot/democracy-inamerica-how-is-it-doing.html [https://perma.cc/7RQL-E4FQI (observing that a survey of political
scientists suggests that "[t]he areas in which American democracy is failing ... concerned civil
behavior. This involved norms that elected majorities should act with restraint and reciprocity,
that politicians should campaign without disparaging their opponents' patriotism or loyalty, and
that public officials should recognize bureaucratic or scientific consensus."); Fareed Zakaria,
Opinion, America's Democracy Has Become Illiberal, WASH. POST (Dec. 29, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinionslamerica-is-becoming-a-land-of-less-liberty/2016/12/291
[https://perma.cclHL3N-U4T3] (concluding
2a91744c-ceO9-11e6-a747-d03044780a02_story.html
that "[i]t turns out that what sustains democracy is not simply legal safeguards and rules, but
norms and practices - democratic behavior").
99. For an example of informal social checks and balances that have generated substantial
controversy, see Jess Bidgood & Julie Bosman, On Martha's Vineyard, a Frosty Summer for Alan
Dershowitz, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/03/us/marthas-vineyardtrump.html [https://perma.cc/AE5X-78PR].
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adequate information about the behavior of these actors, however, the
informal social pressure that enforces social checks and balances cannot
occur. The erosion of social checks and balances can also extend well
beyond political agendas and can undermine democratic debates and
actions among the general public.
The FCC FairnessDoctrine. In addition to the transformation of
the media over the last several decades, an important development
regarding the flow of information occurred when the federal
government withdrew from policing media fairness and accuracy. The
FCC's Fairness Doctrine, adopted in 1949 and modified over time,
required radio and television news outlets to feature opposing
viewpoints on controversial topics. 0 0 The Fairness Doctrine required
outlets to devote a reasonable amount of time on the air to controversial
issues of public importance and to give air time to citizens with
contrasting perspectives regarding those matters.1 0 1 The Doctrine
included several corollary rules, such as the Cullman rule, which
necessitated time on the air for individuals with different views on
controversial issues, even if those individuals could not pay for the
time. 102 The personal attack rule required companies to allow response
time on the air for individuals or groups whose honesty or character
was attacked. 10 3 The political editorial rule forced broadcasters who
endorsed or supported political candidates to give time on the air to
opposing candidates who wanted to respond. 104 As the FCC stated in
1964, the Fairness Doctrine supplemented the requirement to provide
opportunities for political candidates to have access to broadcast
facilities and dealt "with the broader question of affording reasonable

100. The first iteration of the Fairness Doctrine appeared in the FCC's 1949 Report,
Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1247 (1949). The FCC established
comprehensive standards in Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of
Controversial Issues of Public Importance, 40 F.C.C. 598 (1964) (discussing equal time and
editorial reply). The FCC also reviewed programming for balance during licensing proceedings for
broadcast media stations. See, e.g., Citizens Comm. to Save WEFM v. FCC, 506 F.2d 246, 278-80,
278 n.45, 279-80 nn.59-63 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (rehearing en banc) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring in the
result). The FCC applied the Fairness Doctrine "in any case in which broadcast facilities are used
for the discussion of a controversial issue of public importance." Applicability of the Fairness
Doctrine in the Handling of Controversial Issues of Public Importance, supra, at 598.
101. Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of Controversial Issues of Public
Importance, supra note 100, at 598-99.
102. See id. at 609 ("[W]here the licensee ... has not presented (or does not plan to present)
contrasting viewpoints in other programming, . . . he cannot reject a presentation otherwise
suitable to the licensee-and thus leave the public uninformed-on the ground that he cannot
obtain paid sponsorship for that presentation.").
103. Id. at 610-14.
104. Id. at 613-14.
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opportunity for the presentation of contrasting
controversial issues of public importance."1 0 5
The FCC stated that:

viewpoints

on

[A licensee] is called upon to make reasonable judgments in good faith on the facts of each
situation-as to whether a controversial issue of public importance is involved, as to what
viewpoints have been or should be presented, as to the format and spokesmen to present
the viewpoints, and all the other facets of such programming.106

.

The FCC also stated that its "role is not to substitute its
judgment for that of the licensee as to any of the above programming
decisions, but rather to determine whether the licensee can be said to
have acted reasonably and in good faith."10 7 The FCC did not
aggressively enforce the Fairness Doctrine requirements in formal
proceedings, but as Jerome Barron stated, "The very existence of the
doctrine cautioned against excessive one-sidedness in the presentation
of public affairs."10 8 In addition, as Judge David Bazelon noted in the
mid-1970s, the FCC frequently enforced the Fairness Doctrine through
informal "raised eyebrow" communications with media executives. 109
Supporters argued that the Fairness Doctrine was needed to
prevent a monopoly of ideas controlled by the wealthy, profit-driven
owners of broadcast stations.1 1 0 Courts pointed to the scarcity of
available bandwidth for television and radio stations, upholding
challenges to the Fairness Doctrine 1 on the theory that absent
government intervention, scarcity could be monopolized to shut down
information flow. 1 1 2 The Supreme Court was vigilant in policing
government restrictions on print media, but it treated restrictions on
radio and television stations differently. 113 In 1969, the Court upheld

the Fairness Doctrine in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,1 14
advancing the "idea that the First Amendment had an affirmative
105. Id. at 599. As Paul Krugman stated in 2002, the Fairness Doctrine "forced broadcast
media to give comparable representation to opposing points of view." Paul Krugman, Opinion, In
Media Res, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2002), https://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/29/opinion/in-mediares.html [https://perma.cc/ET3M-CVMN].
106. Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of Controversial Issues of Public
Importance, supra note 100, at 599.
107. This allows for more licensee discretion under the Fairness Doctrine than under the
"equal opportunities" requirement. Id.
108. Barron, Access to the Media, supra note 74, at 943.
109. Bazelon, supra note 73, at 215-17.
110. Mark A. Conrad, The Demise of the FairnessDoctrine:A Blow for Citizen Access, 41 FED.
COMM. L.J. 161, 162 (1989).
111. Id. at 188.
112. Id. at 181.
113. In Miami Herald PublishingCo. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974), the Supreme Court
struck down a state fairness law as applied to a newspaper's coverage on the ground that there
was not a similar scarcity to radio and television.
114. 395 U.S. 367, 400-01 (1969).
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dimension and that law could not only protect freedom of expression but
facilitate it."115 Much of the battle over the Fairness Doctrine concerned
"the idea that a radio or television station had an obligation . .. to
provide the community it served with a roughly representative
overview of the issues that beset its audience."1 1 6 In fact, scholars such
as Barron thought that the Fairness Doctrine did not go far enough. He
argued that America's "romantic" First Amendment theory allowed the
repression of certain ideas to promote others,1 1 7 and that because power
is in the hands of those who control the media, 118 Congress should enact
legislation that would create a right of access to broadcast channels to
ensure that broadcasters could not arbitrarily deny space to candidates,
ideas, or groups.1 19 Other scholars suggested that evidence of any
chilling effect from the Fairness Doctrine was minimal, anecdotal and
speculative, and that the doctrine in fact enhanced discourse. 12 0
Over time, however, the Fairness Doctrine became the
government constraint that everyone loved to hate. 12 1 It was heavily
criticized by free-speech advocates, who complained that the doctrine
chilled national discourse on important issues.1 2 2 Many on the right
expressed concerns that the doctrine was a way for Democrats to silence

115. Barron, Access to the Media, supra note 74, at 938. The Court held that a right of access
to the media was not necessary in the First Amendment in part because the FCC's Fairness
Doctrine was available. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 13032 (1973). The Supreme Court has held that there is no right of access to private print media.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 250-58 (noting that as to concentration of ownership, "[t]he result of these
vast changes has been to place in a few hands the power to inform the American people and shape
public opinion"). After Tornillo, fairness concerns led to three types of responses by private media
companies: press ombudsmen, op-ed pages, and press councils. Barron, Access to the Media, supra
note 74, at 942-43.
116. Barron, Access to the Media, supranote 74, at 944.
117. Id. at 1642.
118. Id. at 1644.
119. See id. at 1678 (arguing that if there is resistance to a judicially created remedy for a
right of access, then a right of access statute may be enacted to "forbid an arbitrary denial of space"
and "secur[e] an effective forum for the expression of divergent opinions").
120. See, e.g., Robyn R. Polashuk, Protecting the Public Debate: The Validity of the Fairness
Doctrine in Ballot Initiative Elections, 41 UCLA L. REV. 391, 435-37 (1993) (noting that "the
irreconcilable findings" from the FCC and Congress demonstrate that "the evidence of any chilling
effect created by the Fairness Doctrine is conflicting at best" and observing that "in the context of
a ballot initiative election, the Fairness Doctrine has enhanced speech by securing coverage of
points that would not have been presented without the regulatory protections").
121. See, e.g., Adam Thierer, Why the Fairness Doctrine Is Anything but Fair, HERITAGE
FOUND. (Oct. 29, 1993), https://www.heritage.org/government-regulation/report/why-the-fairnessdoctrine-anything-fair [https://perma.cc/4N5B-83T3].
122. See Dominic E. Markwordt, More Folly than Fairness:The Fairness Doctrine, the First
Amendment, and the Internet Age, 22 REGENT U. L. REV. 405, 408 (2009) (describing how critics
"claim that a Democratic Congress and President seek the return of the fairness doctrine to silence
conservative critics of Congress and the administration").
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conservative voices 1 23 in an "Orwellian" fashion. 124 Moreover, even after
Red Lion, critics argued that the Fairness Doctrine created a limitation
on free expression in violation of the First Amendment.1 25 Others
complained that the doctrine was unfair because it targeted broadcast
news media but did not address other media, such as print. 126 Critics of
the Fairness Doctrine also noted that an important rationale for the
doctrine was to counter the effect of the concentration of the media
industry on its ability to exclude unpopular viewpoints, but because a
large, diverse pool of voices had emerged, scarcity was no longer an
issue, and there was no way to monopolize the conversation.1 2 7 As one
critic argued, "Whatever strained justification some thought there was
for the doctrine in 1949 has dissipated with time and the advancement
of technology. Scarcity has been replaced with 10,000 radio stations and
12 8
more cable channels than there is programming to fill them."
The FCC repealed the Fairness Doctrine in 1987.129 Congress
attempted to block the FCC's effort, but President Reagan vetoed the
legislation, 130 and in 2000 the FCC took the additional step of abolishing
personal attack rules. 131 The Fairness Doctrine has been the subject of
extensive debate since then, and supporters attempted to revive the
Doctrine in 1993 and 2008,132 but the Obama Administration ultimately

123. See Roland F.L. Hall, The FairnessDoctrine and the First Amendment: Phoenix Rising,
45 MERCER L. REV. 705, 705-06 (1994) (noting opponents "call[ed] the Act the 'Hush Rush' bill,
and claim[ed] that a Democratic Congress and President [sought] the return of the fairness
doctrine to silence conservative critics of Congress and the administration").
2008),
(June 17,
Editorial, 'Fairness' Is Censorship, WASH. TIMES
124. See
[https://perma.cc/
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/jun/17/fairness-is-censorship/
QL6E-TLU9].
125. See Conrad, supra note 110, at 173 (describing how "[t]he uncertainties created by the
greater number of access claims, coupled with the reverberations from Red Lion" led the FCC to
compile a comprehensive report on the Fairness Doctrine to assess, in part, whether the Doctrine
conflicted with the First Amendment).
126. See id. at 168 (noting that "print media has never been subject to such content
regulation").
127. See Thierer, supra note 121 (describing supporters' argument that "the 'scarce' amount of
spectrum space requires oversight by federal regulators" as a "faulty premise" because the number
of radio and television stations available today make it "impossible" to "monopolize the airwaves"
and "deny access to certain viewpoints").
128. Mario M. Cuomo, Opinion, The Unfairness Doctrine, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 1993),
[https://perma.cc/
https://www.nytimes.com/1993/09/20/opinion/the-unfairness-doctrine.html

3VQU-QK58].
129. Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043, 5057 (1987) (concluding "that the fairness
doctrine contravenes the First Amendment and thereby disserves the public interest"), enforced,
867 F.2d 654, 665 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
130. Lepore, supra note 13.
131. See Radio-Television News Dirs. Ass'n v. FCC, 229 F.3d 269, 272 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
132. See Cuomo, supra note 128 ("Legislation pending in Congress would revive the so-called
fairness doctrine, which the Federal Communications Commission repealed in 1987."); 'Fairness'
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eliminated the rule from the Federal Register in 2011.133 Today, the
FCC only requires media companies to provide political candidates with
"reasonable access" and "equal opportunities." 1 3 4 Supporters of the
Fairness Doctrine have argued that the FCC's 1987 decision to repeal
facilitated the development of media outlets with an explicit policy or
partisan agenda. 135 MSNBC and Fox News were formed in 1996, and
some have argued that neither could exist under the old Fairness
Doctrine.1 36 Similarly, the number of talk radio stations in the United
States increased from two hundred and forty in 1987 to nine hundred
in 1992.137 Not all of these new stations focus on polarized political
audiences, but many do.
In sum, as a result of the transformation of the media industry
and the FCC's actions, the challenge of ensuring adequate information
for democratic discourse has been turned on its head. The underlying
vulnerability of the system has shifted from a concern about whether a
very concentrated industry could manipulate the information it
provides to a broad audience, to whether a less concentrated group of
broadcasters and other firms could use multiple information pathways
to manipulate information by channeling it to multiple narrow
audiences. This channelization of information is the target of the
private fairness doctrine initiative proposed in Part III.
III. A PRIVATE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE
Is there a cure to the current information problem that is not
worse than the disease? Private governance initiatives that attempt to
harness social checks and balances regarding democratic processes are
less common than private initiatives that target governmental
functions such as environmental protection and labor standards. This
is not surprising given that the processes of democracy are at the core
of what we think of as government, and a major conceptual leap is
required to imagine that private initiatives, rather than only public
initiatives, could play an important role in this area. To demonstrate
is Censorship, supra note 124 ("Over the last year, though, top Democrats have said repeatedly
that they would like to bring the Fairness Doctrine back.").
133. Dylan Matthews, Everything You Need to Know About the FairnessDoctrine in One Post,
WASH. POST (Aug. 23, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/post/everythingyou-need-to-know-about-the-fairness-doctrine-in-one-post/2011/08/23/gIQAN8CXZJblog.html
[https://perma.ccWJ79-9Y2J].
134. 47 U.S.C. §§ 312(a)(7), 315(a) (2012).
135. See Lepore, supra note 13 ("The repeal [of the Fairness Doctrine] ... made possible a new
kind of partisan talk radio.").
136. See id.
137. Id.
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the possibilities for private initiatives, this Part proposes a private
effort to develop, administer, and enforce a modern fairness doctrine
and then discusses objections and extensions. 138
OrganizationalStructure. A new private-sector initiative could
draft, publish, administer, enforce, and periodically update the new
private fairness doctrine. The initiative could follow the pattern of the
most successful private, collective standard-setting organizations, such
as the Equator Principles and the MSC. Initial financial support and
expertise could be provided by philanthropists, journalism institutes,
media experts, advocacy groups, traditional and new media companies,
employee organizations, advertisers, investors, and lenders.
The initial organizers could follow the pattern of other private
standard-setting bodies by forming a broad stakeholder group to
oversee the development and implementation of the new standard. The
now-repealed FCC Fairness Doctrine could serve as the jumping-off
point for the new private fairness doctrine, with modifications to reflect
critiques of the 1987 version plus developments in technology and the
media industry. Although the private effort could evaluate the accuracy
and completeness of information on an ongoing basis, the task of
reviewing information daily or even monthly may be overwhelming. A
more feasible approach would be to conduct an evaluation and
certification every several years of the processes used by the media
companies. In other words, the standard could apply to the internal
rules and processes that a media company uses to generate, screen,
distribute, update, and correct the information it distributes, along with
an assessment of the work product from the prior several-year period.
Private standard setting combined with certification for a period
of several years is the approach used by the MSC, which periodically
certifies fisheries and the firms that operate within them. The MSC
does not attempt to certify the fish caught by the fishery on an ongoing

138. For

valuable

sources

on

this

topic,

see

ELECTRONIC

FRONTIER

FOUND.,

https://www.eff.org/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2020) [https://perma.cc/5Q8B-FU73] (describing itself as
"[t]he leading nonprofit defending digital privacy, free speech, and innovation"); KNIGHT FIRST
(last visited Apr. 1, 2020)
https://knightcolumbia.org/
INST. COLUM. U.,
AMEND.
[https://perma.cc/QS5U-VLA7] (providing access to the Institute's litigation, research, and other
work). Services such as Poynter are used for fact checking by new media firms. See Fact-Checking,
(last visited Apr. 1, 2020)
POYNTER, https://www.poynter.org/media-news/fact-checking/
[https://perma.cc/3TYM-D4D7]; Spandada Singh & Kevin Bankston, The TransparencyReporting
Toolkit: Content Takedown Reporting, NEW AM., https://www.newamerica.org/otilreports/
(last updated Oct. 25, 2018)
transparency-reporting-toolkit-content-takedown-reporting/
(providing information on "how 35 global internet and
[https://perma.cc/P8JY-UM4G]
telecommunications companies report on six categories of content takedowns" and suggesting best
practices for improving reporting on content practices). For an early exploration of the regulation
of the internet, see LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999).
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basis. 139 Instead, if a firm follows the prescribed methods of fishing
within that fishery, it can display a label on the packaging of the fish it
catches from that fishery.14 0 Similarly, a certified media firm could
display the logo of the private fairness doctrine organization, providing
an easy way for investors, lenders, corporate and retail consumers,
advocacy groups, current employees, and potential job applicants to
determine which firms they should engage with and which firms they
should avoid. The most influential users of the certifications would
likely be major advertisers, who could avoid conflicts among their
stakeholders about the accuracy and completeness of the information
conveyed by the media firms they advertise with by announcing that
they will only advertise with media firms that receive a certification or
are "A"-rated. The certifications could affect retail consumers if mobile
phone applications enable customers to shop from retailers who only
advertise with certified media organizations. Potential viewers could
also check their phones to evaluate the ratings of the media sources
when deciding which to use, although this is less likely to be influential
since many media viewers already select media sources based on the
worldview or ideology of the media sources. In short, the certification
could harness market and social forces and become a clear signal of the
media firm's social license to operate for the designated period.
Content of the Standard. Perhaps the most difficult issue is how
to determine the content of the standard. The heterogeneity of the
media industry (traditional and new media, etc.) suggests that the
organization may need to develop general principles plus more specific
standards that apply to particular sectors. For instance, the standards
necessary for radio and television may be quite different from the
standards necessary for internet firms such as Facebook, Google, and
Twitter. In addition, given the experience with fair trade, organic food,
and sustainable forestry standards, formation of an initial standard
may lead to development of competing standards. 14 1 Research suggests
that this may dilute the effect of private standard setting somewhat but
is not fatal unless the proliferation of imposter standards ambiguates
the signal sent by the most credible standards. 142
139. Will Martin, Marine Stewardship Council: A Case Study in Private Environmental
Standard-Setting, 44 ENvTL. L. REP. 10097, 10099 (2014) (noting that instead of setting arbitrary
requirements, "[t]he MSC program ... judges a fishery on both the outcomes (environmental
impacts) and inputs (quality and effectiveness of the management) of the fishing operations").
140. See id. at 10097.
141. See, e.g., Carolyn Fischer & Thomas P. Lyon, Competing Environmental Labels, 23 J.
EcON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 692, 693 (2014).
142. See id.; see also Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA.
L. REV. 349, 358 (1997) (addressing concerns about ambiguation that can undermine
communications regarding social norms, as related to individuals' decisions to obey the law or
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As discussed at the outset, the goal would not be to achieve
balance, a concept that makes little sense for many scientific and
factual issues, but rather accuracy and completeness. Accuracy and
completeness in all cases is obviously a nearly impossible task to
perform, but certification pressure can drive improvements. The
standard could include provisions addressing the transparency of the
process used to assess information and the sources of information, and
nonpartisan or independent reviews of the accuracy and completeness
of the information conveyed. Private organizations that give
"pinocchios" for falsehoods or otherwise provide public fact-checking
functions demonstrate that this type of effort is imperfect but
possible.1 4 3 The private fairness doctrine would combine the assessment
capabilities of these organizations with the market and social
enforcement mechanisms used by private certification and standards
organizations.
The standard also could follow the lead of the FCC Fairness
Doctrine and require some form of equal access to the media by
politicians. Access issues do not appear to be at the core of the current
information problem, however, and attempting to do too much may
undermine the feasibility and legitimacy of the initiative. Thus,
although it is tempting to argue that the standard should require equal
access, this is not the most important goal.
Updating of the Standard.The development of new technologies
and experience with the standard will require updates on a periodic
basis. 144 The ISEAL standards require organizations to use a
45
transparent, open process to set and update private standards.1
commit crimes). The development of competing standards has occurred in other areas, such as

sustainable forestry, where an industry-supported standard emerged to compete with a standard
perceived to be more eco-friendly. If that occurs with a private fairness doctrine-for example, if
organizations form around standards that are more supported by liberals versus conservativesthere is a risk that the existence of multiple standards will undermine the effort. See Thomas P.
Lyon & John W. Maxwell, Corporate Social Responsibility and the Environment: A Theoretical
Perspective, 1 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL'Y 1 (2008) (posing questions about the interactions
between environmental initiatives taken by companies, private actors, and governmental
environmental regulation). At the same time, the competition between the standards could bring
some clarity to the debate over what constitutes accurate or complete information, and it may be
preferable to the current free-for-all.
143. See, e.g., Beyond the Truth-O-Meter, POLITIFACT, https://www.politifact.com/curation/

nationallarchive/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2020) [https://perma.cc/YA6P-P82D] (assessing the accuracy
of media stories); FactCheck Posts, FACTCHECK.ORG, https://www.factcheck.org/the-factcheckwire/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2020) [https://perma.cc/DTE4-U3LM] (same); Glenn Kessler, Fact
Checker: The Truth Behind the Rhetoric, WASH. POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/factchecker/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2020) [https://perma.cc/9RR8-LM6D] (giving "pinocchio" ratings for
false statements in politics).
144. For instance, new technologies are on the horizon that are expected to make it essentially
impossible to determine whether a video has been altered.
145. See discussion supra note 51.
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Systems such as the Equator Principles and MSC have used processes
that include publishing a draft standard, taking comment, revising the
standard, publicly responding to comments, and publishing a revised
standard. 146 As with these other private standards, the private fairness
doctrine could be updated periodically through transparent processes
that are open to public participation.
Monitoring and Enforcement. The private fairness doctrine
organization could monitor and certify compliance with the standard,
or independent auditors could serve this function. The experience of
certification and standards organizations in the sustainability field
suggests that the staffing requirements could be substantial for these
tasks, so the use of third-party auditors may be more feasible.147 If the
monitoring activities follow the pattern of monitoring in other private
systems, the independence of these private auditors will be essential,
and the system cannot allow them to be compromised by funding,
competence issues, or selection of auditors whose decisions are
dominated by ideology or worldview. 148 The existence of fact-checking
organizations suggests that norms for auditing information already
exist in this area, and over time a private auditing field may arise with
experts and professional norms that provide standards of conduct. The
professional norms of reporters, editors, and other media professionals
may also play a role if they are linked to compliance with the private
fairness doctrine.
The FCC used its radio and television licensing authority as
leverage for imposing the federal Fairness Doctrine, but that option is
obviously not available for a private standard. Experience with many
types of private governance systems, though, suggests that
nonregulatory influences can be very powerful. A media firm that is
certified by the private fairness doctrine organization could receive
preferences from advertisers, lenders, shareholders, supply-chain
contractors, and retail customers, and those firms that fail to qualify
could face sanctions ranging from retail consumer boycotts, to investor
divestment or pressure, to naming-and-shaming efforts that target
media shareholders and managers. In addition, professional norms
could induce the most talented journalists and other media employees
146. See The EquatorPrinciples:June 2006, supra note 49; MSC StandardSetting Procedure,
supra note 52.
147. See Vandenbergh, supra note 8.
148. One outcome of the private fairness doctrine may be that many of the mainstream
organizations, even if they tilt heavily to the left or right, find ways to achieve a certification from
the organization, but the effort may still play an important role if it discourages outliers whose
reports have little claim to accuracy or completeness. Some organizations may perceive the failure
to achieve a certification as a badge of honor, but so long as these are outliers who only appeal to
small constituencies, they should not undermine the overall effect of the private fairness doctrine.
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to opt to work for certified media firms, leading media firms to seek
certification to improve employee recruitment and retention.
Objections. Any intervention of this type poses risks, but the
proper standard for judging this initiative is not how it compares to
ideal alternatives but how it compares to likely or feasible
alternatives.1 4 9 In the case of the Fairness Doctrine, there are two likely
alternatives: revival of government regulation or continued muddling
through without any systematic, accountable oversight. The first option
is highly unlikely, and if it occurs, it may be worse than the current
situation. If one of the problems with government checks and balances
is one-party control of government, government intervention in the
media may make matters worse. For instance, in response to anger
about the information being provided to viewers via new media, at least
one close associate of President Trump threatened to nationalize
companies such as Google and Facebook.1 50
The second option--continued lack of any systemic public or
private oversight-is probably more likely, but it comes at a price.
Democratic government is difficult in the best of all worlds, but when
large segments of the population are not exposed to core facts or are
taught to dismiss them, the ability to choose among politicians and
policy options and to reach compromises based on those facts is a
fraught process. Inaccurate and incomplete information may contribute
to erosion of the social checks and balances that might otherwise induce
politicians to abide by basic rules of fair play while in office.
Channelized information flow may also make the political process more
vulnerable to foreign government interventions by simplifying the
targeting necessary to promote polarization and undermining the
ability to find common ground on important issues. Although private
efforts directed at the media have proliferated on the left and right,
including efforts to shame or boycott media companies based on the
perceived accuracy or fairness of the information they distribute, these
efforts have been largely ad hoc and have had mixed success thus far.
In addition, the experience of new media firms suggests that the design
149. See, e.g., Jonathan M. Gilligan & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Accounting for Political
Feasibility in Climate Instrument Choice, 32 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2014) (discussing the standards
for reviewing public and private policy alternatives with respect to climate instrument choice).
150. See Tina Nguyen, Steve Bannon Wants to Nationalize Facebook and Google's Data,
VANITY FAIR (Aug. 30, 2018), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2018/08/steve-bannon-big-datafacebook-twitter-google [https://perma.cc/Y6WV-GSW5]; see also Adi Robertson, Trump Says
Google, Twitter, and FacebookAre on 'Troubled Territory'and'Better be Careful,'VERGE (Aug. 28,
https://www.theverge.com/2018/8/28/17792764/trump-google-rigged-search2018, 3:50 PM),
results-claim-response [https://perma.cclTS88-VXY6] (discussing President Trump's "veiled
threats toward Google and other web platforms," which followed the President's tweet about how
"Google had 'rigged' its search results to suppress positive news about him").
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and implementation of corporate content policies is occurring, but it is
proceeding in a nontransparent, unaccountable fashion that has
satisfied few observers.1 5 1
Content Challenges. Private initiatives such as the MSC have
been able to develop standards in part because they are grounded in
science-based concepts. Although deep disagreement exists at the
margins, the number of fish that can be caught annually from a fishery
without impairing its yield in future years is a knowable fact, subject to
measurement and testing. The same is true for forest harvesting, palm
oil harvesting, labor standards, and other areas that have been the
subject of extensive private initiatives. Assessing accuracy and
completeness on hotly contested social and political issues is
undoubtedly more difficult. A private standard for the media faces both
theoretical and practical concerns, but some organizations already
appear to be successfully assessing factual statements for veracity, and
these organizations could be included in the effort. At a minimum, their
experiences could inform the development of a new private fairness
doctrine.
In addition, the fairness doctrine organization would not focus
on any one statement, but instead would examine whether the media
firm had adopted and implemented the systems necessary to screen out
false statements or situations in which a lack of complete treatment of
facts would make the media coverage misleading. The process may
include review of specific articles, advertisements, or news accounts. At
the same time, the focus on the media firms' systems, not any particular
piece of information, might avoid some of the difficulties of assessing
facts on complex or controversial issues.
Accountability. Would a private fairness doctrine be sufficiently
accountable to the public? Would it be commandeered by a particular
market, social, or political actor? Accountability in this situation refers
to the accountability of the private fairness doctrine organization to the
public. The lack of a direct, formal democratic accountability
mechanism could lead to an initiative that is detached from majority
preferences, suppresses important minority interests, or otherwise does
not serve public purposes. A comprehensive accountability analysis is
beyond the scope of this Essay, but it would include identifying who
should be accountable to whom, the actors who could ensure
accountability, and the methods to achieve accountability. 1 52 For my
151. See Romm, supra note 14 (describing Facebook's plan to create "an independent oversight
board to review the company's decisions about the posts, photos and videos it takes down or leaves
online, responding to a wave of criticism that inconsistent policies have undermined the platform").
152. For a discussion of accountability concepts for private governance, see Vandenbergh,
supra note 67, at 956-63.
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purposes here, I simply argue that the relative differences in
accountability between a private system and our current government
system are disturbingly small. A private system would not be subject to
many of the accountability features of the democratic process-such as
voting and the full range of public checks and balances-and it may be
vulnerable to capture by commercial or ideological interests. Private
ways to ensure
developed many
governance systems have
accountability, however, and many of these concerns can be addressed
by creating an open, broad-based oversight process for the initiative.
Demand. Perhaps the most fundamental objection to a private
fairness doctrine is that insufficient demand may exist for greater
accuracy and completeness of the information that flows from
traditional and new media. Are enough managers of advocacy groups,
other organizations, and members of the general public dissatisfied
with the status quo to demand and invest in an alternative? Does
sufficient perceived need exist to motivate the core stakeholders who
are necessary to fund, adopt, monitor, and enforce the standard? If the
initiative does not include a real or implied threat from a sufficiently
broad or strong group of private enforcers, it will not succeed, and it is
possible that only a small group of centrists will join those at the far
ends of the spectrum, or that two partisan standards, one on the left,
and one on the right, will emerge. The private fairness doctrine effort
could start modestly, though, and focus initially on an area with
significant support across the political spectrum, such as policies
directed at new media companies. 153
Importance. On a related note, it is possible that the flow of
accurate, complete information is not an important problem. For
instance, inadequate information may not be a substantial contributor
to the polarization problem, or polarization may not be a fundamental
problem for the functioning of U.S. democracy. Although I discuss these
issues above, it is beyond the scope of this Essay to address them in any
detail. From my perspective, though, information problems are a
sufficient challenge to the ability of the democratic process to generate
a public-regarding government to warrant a substantial response. In
addition, the other options are implausible or unattractive. The FCC
154
but this option
could adopt a modern version of the Fairness Doctrine,
seems dead in the water politically. The FCC recently rejected net
neutrality, a form of protection for the flow of information via the
internet, and adoption of a new Fairness Doctrine is even more difficult

153. See Klonick, supra note 14, at 1601.
154. Efforts to revive the Doctrine in 1993 and 2008 failed, and the Obama Administration
ultimately eliminated the rule from the Federal Register in 2011. Matthews, supra note 133.
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to envision. Government restriction of free speech raises legal and
policy concerns from across the political spectrum, so change of control
of the executive branch is unlikely to have a substantial effect on the
FCC's appetite for a new government Fairness Doctrine. Similarly,
although surveys suggest that the public supports government
requirements for balanced commentary, the support does not extend to
internet-based communications. 15 5
Greater use of private initiatives could also lead to greater,
rather than less, polarization and self-sorting in the population. For
example, private initiatives on the left and the right could just infect
nonpartisan areas of daily life with partisan tribalism and reduce
dialogue across groups. If conservatives eat at Chick-fil-A while liberals
eat at the local organic restaurant, and outdoor enthusiasts choose
between Dick's Sporting Goods and competitors based on their policies
regarding the sales of assault weapons, polarization could be
exacerbated. Demographic trends in the United States already suggest
that a fair amount of self-sorting is occurring, with Democrats tending
to live near other Democrats and Republicans living near other
Republicans. 156 If they also tend to shop differently as a result of this
initiative, that could undermine the efficacy of the initiative and
exacerbate other effects of polarization. The existence of retailers,
institutional investors, and other firms that need to reach a very broad
audience suggests that this is a small risk, but it is a concern that is
worthy of additional research and thought in the design of any private
initiative.
Vulnerability to Manipulation. Another concern with any
private system is that market or social influences could yield a private
governance system that serves narrow interests. The standard would
be counterproductive if commandeered by narrow interests, as occurred
with Hollywood's blacklisting practice during the period of fears about
155. For instance, a 2008 national survey of one thousand likely voters by Rasmussen Reports
found that forty-seven percent of those surveyed answered "yes" to the question, "Should the
government require all radio and television stations to offer equal amounts of conservative and
liberal political commentary?" 47% Favor Government Mandated PoliticalBalance on Radio, TV,
RASMUSSEN REP. (Aug. 14, 2008), http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public-content/politics/
general politics/august_2008/47_favor-government mandated politicalbalanceon-radio-tv
[https://perma.cc/JQ5H-9AYY]. Among the other respondents, thirty-nine percent said "no" and
fourteen percent answered "not sure." Id. In contrast, fifty-seven percent of those surveyed

answered "no" to the question, "Should the government require web sites and bloggers that offer
political commentary to present opposing viewpoints?" Id. Of the other respondents, thirty-one
percent said "yes," and twelve percent said "not sure." Id.
156. See Alan Greenblatt, How Republicans and Democrats Ended up Living Apart, NPR (Nov.
27, 2013, 11:09 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/itsallpolitics/2013/11/26/247362143fhowrepublicans-and-democrats-ended-up-living-apart
[https://perma.cc/X9RB-YF3R];
see
also
TALISSE, supra note 2, at 73 (describing the trend of "social spaces ...
growing increasingly
politically homogeneous" as "robust" and "applying to social spaces across the board").
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communism in the 1950s. Similarly, anticompetitive interests could
dominate, leading to a system that promotes certain commercial
interests at the expense of broader public concerns. Antitrust law may
address this problem to some extent.15 7 At the same time, if antitrust
law is vigorously enforced to reduce anticompetitiveness concerns
without accounting for the benefits of a private standard, it could do
more harm than good.16 8
Social or political manipulation is another concern. If captured
by liberals or conservatives, or Democrats or Republicans, a private
system could be used to promote a particular viewpoint rather than to
promote the distribution of accurate and complete information.
Similarly, if private initiatives often better reflect weakly held but
widespread preferences in the population, there is a risk that they could
lead to discrimination against minority interests. The existence of
organized hate groups certainly suggests that this is a risk if these
groups form new media pressure groups or commandeer existing ones.
In the long run, the most feasible and effective insurance against
market, social, or political manipulation may arise from the
composition of the stakeholder group that oversees the initiative and
the need of that stakeholder group to maintain the legitimacy of the
standard and its implementation. These are limited constraints, but
they have enabled other private systems to succeed over the long
term. 159
Spillover Effects. What effect will a private initiative have on the
likelihood of government responses to information problems? Private
actions could have negative spillover effects on government's ability to
act. This could arise through the expressive effects of private action if
the existence of private action undermines the idea that government
has an important role and can perform it effectively. Negative spillover

157. For instance, a private association organized to regulate media operations or content
must not run afoul of the antitrust standard set forth in Fashion Originators'Guild (known as
FOGA). Fashion Originators' Guild of Am., Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 312 U.S. 457 (1941). The
marketplace of ideas can be seen as a form of check and balance. There is an important normative
dimension to antitrust in cases including companies like Comcast and AT&T, where concentration
of market power influences the flow of information in an intellectual marketplace.
158. See Michael P. Vandenbergh & Ben Raker, Private Governance and the New Private
Advocacy, 32 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 45, 49 (2017) (noting that in the context of private
environmental advocacy, "[flor some [private] initiatives, the risks of anticompetitive behavior
could outweigh the benefits of increased environmental protection").
159. For a review of the effects of sustainability certification and standards systems, see
TOWARD SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 17, at 9 (citing "data on the current market status of key
voluntary standards and certification systems relating to forestry, fisheries, and food"); and Errol
E. Meidinger, Environmental CertificationPrograms and U.S. Environmental Law: Closer than
You Think, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10162, 10163 (2001) (arguing that "environmental certification
programs are likely to become important engines of change in American environmental law").
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effects also could occur if individuals believe that the problem has been
solved and thus do not push for a better government solution, or if they
engage in moral licensing, concluding that because they took one
positive step (e.g., watching a fairness-certified television program)
they are licensed to take a negative step (e.g., retweeting inaccurate
information).1 60 Private initiatives could also divert funds, management
attention, or enthusiasm from public to private actions. At the same
time, private initiatives can have positive spillover effects by
demonstrating proof of concept, reducing the costs of compliance with
government mandates, demonstrating efficacy, and bypassing
worldview-based opposition to public governance. Overall, spillover
issues are important, but a growing body of research suggests that
many types of negative spillover effects can be reduced if not
prevented.161

Extensions. The private fairness doctrine initiative is only one of
many possible private options that could buttress democratic processes.
The important move at this point is to overcome the failure of
imagination that can occur if we focus only on government checks and
balances and overlook social checks and balances. An example of a new
option is the concept of the private campaign finance contract discussed
by Ganesh Sitaraman and deployed by Scott Brown and Elizabeth
Warren. 162 As Sitaraman noted, the contract between Brown and
Warren could serve as a model for campaign finance agreements in
other campaigns. For a range of reasons, however, the concept has not
gone viral. Although it may be the case that few races involve incentives
for both candidates to enter into a voluntary campaign finance
agreement, the assumption that campaign finance is a matter of public
law may have induced candidates to miss the rhetorical advantage of
offering to enter into an agreement. In other words, even if the opposing
candidate declines to agree to enter into such an agreement, the refusal

160. For a discussion of positive and negative spillover effects, see Heather Barnes Truelove
et al., Positive and Negative Spillover of Pro-environmentalBehavior: An IntegrativeReview and
TheoreticalFramework, 29 GLOBAL ENvTL. CHANGE 127 (2014).
161. Id. at 135-36.
162. See Sitaraman, supra note 27, at 757 (describing generally the private-ordering "selfenforcing contract" as one "between ... opposing campaigns, in which each campaign agrees to be
penalized from its own campaign treasury for any spending from an outside group that supports
the candidate"). The Brown-Warren contract limited the contributions that each candidate would
accept in the 2012 Massachusetts Senate race. See id. at 757-58 (describing "The Peoples' Pledge"
signed by Senators Scott Brown and Elizabeth Warren in January 2012, which "required each
campaign to pay to charity the equivalent of 50% of any third party's advertising costs for
advertisements that benefitted their candidacy"). Although a promising innovation, the BrownWarren private campaign finance initiative has yet to be replicated widely in other U.S.
campaigns. See id. at 758. This concept of social checks and balances can generate a wide range of
promising options, and many other initiatives are possible in the campaign finance area.
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to do so can become fodder for debates and campaign advertisements.
Over the longer term, private organizations can develop public
databases that track and disclose which candidates declined to enter
into these agreements and use public information campaigns to put the
private campaign finance contract option on the national agenda. In
addition, many other private governance possibilities exist in the
campaign finance area. 163
Similarly, new initiatives could target the ease of voting and the
integrity of vote counting. Several efforts are already underway
regarding voting. For instance, a recent get-out-the-vote effort included
64
roughly 150 companies ranging from Levi Strauss to Lyft to Walmart.1
The initiative includes media campaigns, rides to the polls, and policies
to allow employees to leave work to vote. 165
One of the ways in which a party can thwart the democratic
system is to not only discourage voting, but also to change vote totals or
to undermine the legitimacy of the system by creating doubt about vote
totals. The extent to which actual interference with vote counting may
have occurred in recent elections is beyond the scope of this Essay, but
sufficient information exists about motives and opportunities to raise
concerns. Several private options are available to address this problem.
One is to fund and deploy a private exit-polling operation that is
sufficiently robust to reveal discrepancies between actual vote totals
and reported totals. Media outlets engage in exit polling now, but a
more comprehensive, systematic effort that focuses on the most
vulnerable elections may be able to ferret out even small interventions
in the process. This effort may assist litigants who challenge a vote

163. An example is the recent effort to crowdsource support for a hypothetical senate opponent
based on the incumbent's vote on a hotly contested issue. See Eli Rosenberg, Activists Raised $1
Million to Defeat Susan Collins if She Votes for Kavanaugh. She Says It's Bribery, WASH. POST
(Sept. 12, 2018, 9:06 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2018/09/12/activists-raisedmillion-defeat-susan-collins-if-she-votes-kavanaugh- she-says-its-bribery/ [https://perma.cc/8PB7YFGF]. Another example of a private campaign finance initiative is an organization that would
organize donor matching to create disincentives for major donors to unduly influence elections.
The organization could identify donors (individuals or PACs) who would publicly announce that
they plan to match the donations of a specific, comparable donor in the other party or on the other
side of an issue. In that way, both donors would have a reduced incentive to give to the campaign
since any gift would provoke an equal response. This would not be a silver bullet (e.g., contributions
could be hidden or donors could believe that their campaign contribution would be more effectively
used than contributions to the opposing campaign), but it might discourage some of the largest
single-donor or single-PAC interventions in elections.
164. Kaitlyn Tiffany, Why Do Brands Care if You Vote?: It's About Democracy, but It's Also
About the Bottom Line, Vox (Sept. 24, 2018, 3:20 PM), https://www.vox.com/thegoods/2018/9/24/17897194/walmart-lyft-get-out-the-vote-midterm-elections-2018-patagonia
[https://perma.cc/9FPS-6925] (discussing the "Time to Vote" campaign).
165. See id.
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tally, and knowledge that the exit-polling data will be extensive and
publicly available could discourage vote manipulation efforts.
Another possibility is a naming-and-shaming campaign directed
at the makers of voting machines. The procurement of voting machines
is not a visible process to most voters or private actors who could
influence procurement, but it could be. Private initiatives could subject
state and local government officials to greater public accountability
regarding their voting machine choices. But even if these officials are
insulated, the companies that make the machines could be subject to
boycotts led by advocacy groups (to the extent they sell products that
are subject to market pressure) and campaigns directed at employee
morale. These companies could also be subject to pressure from
investors, lenders, and suppliers. These are just a few of the many
possible private initiatives that could buttress basic democratic
processes.
CONCLUSION
This Essay focuses on the flow of information necessary to
sustain democratic discourse, and it focuses on two developments that
have contributed to the polarized, dysfunctional discourse that is
common today. The first is the transformation of the media sector over
the last several decades. The radio and television sectors have shifted
from being dominated by a few large traditional media firms with some
incentive to retain the credibility of people across the political spectrum
to the current combination of traditional and new media, both of which
have incentives to create narrow information channels that enable
individuals to insulate themselves from facts and opinions inconsistent
with their worldview. 166 The second is the withdrawal of the federal
government from the role of policing the fairness and accuracy of
information conveyed by the media. Beginning in 1949, the FCC's
Fairness Doctrine imposed equal time, editorial reply, and other
requirements on radio and television stations. Although the Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of the Fairness Doctrine in Red Lion
Broadcasting v. FCC, 16 7 the FCC eliminated the Fairness Doctrine in
1987, and the next decade saw an explosion in the number of talk radio

166.
between
internet
167.

See Bump, supra note 77 (describing "two overlapping trends"-increased polarization
Democrats and Republicans, and the fragmentation of media sources caused by the
and social media).
395 U.S. 367, 400-01 (1969).
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stations as well as the founding in the mid-1990s of Fox News and
MSNBC. 16 8
In response, this Essay suggests a new private fairness doctrine.
Despite the obvious difficulties with any effort to regulate the content
and flow of information, the issues today are whether the deep flaws in
modern democratic discourse warrant some intervention and whether
a private option is preferable to a government option. By contributing
to a poorly informed, insular, and deeply divided electorate, the
channelization of information flow can undermine democratic discourse
and the social checks and balances that constrain misbehavior by
politicians. The experience over the last two decades with other private
governance initiatives suggests that a private option is viable. Although
this Essay argues that private initiatives can improve the information
available for democratic discourse, the more fundamental point is that
scholars and democracy advocates should avoid the assumption that
efforts to change government are the only way to improve government.
Instead, in some cases parallel private initiatives are more viable and
can buttress formal democratic processes.

168. See Cuomo, supra note 128 ("Scarcity has been replaced with 10,000 radio stations and
more cable channels than there is programming to fill them."); Lepore, supra note 13 (describing
how the repeal of the Fairness Doctrine "made possible a new kind of partisan talk radio" and
subsequently, "[p]artisan cable television").

